Sobre o problema da identidade pessoal: David Hume e seus críticos

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2010
Autor(a) principal: Matheus Batista dos Reis
Orientador(a): Não Informado pela instituição
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Não Informado pela instituição
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: Não Informado pela instituição
Palavras-chave em Português:
Link de acesso: https://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUOS-8VFHMK
Resumo: On the problem of personal identity: David Hume and his critics the problem of personal identity is, perhaps, the most polemic topic of David Hume's (1711-1776) philosophy. Three causes can be pointed: the innovation of Hume's explanation when he defines the mind as a bundle of perceptions that lacks perfect identity; the confession, in "Appendix", of dissatisfaction with his own explication and, finally, the fact that he abandons the problem in his posterior works. Scholars approaches personal identity problem by looking what is the inconsistency in the theory, acknowledged by Hume, in order to draw the real nature of his dissatisfaction. This dissertation follows a different path. Our aim is to analyze the reception of Hume's theory by two contemporarys philosophers of him: Thomas Reid (1710-1796) and James Beattie (1735-1803). Therefore, our research is primarily historical and tries to rebuild Beattie's and Reid's criticism of Hume's philosophy. Choosing these philosophers is justified for the importance of both to modern philosophical context. Representing the so-called common sense philosophy, Reid and Beattie's interpretation of Hume's philosophy - mainly in Treatise of Human Nature - contributed to a diffusion of Hume as a radical skeptic. That is why Hume releases a note denying the Treatise. Such note was characterized by Hume as "a compleat Answer to Dr. Reid and to that bigotted silly Fellow, Beattie. That said, we try, in the first chapter, to analyze personal identity explanation on Treatise's section 1.4.6 and to examine the nature of Hume's dissatisfaction confessed in the Appendix. In the second chapter, we present the common sense philosopher's criticism of the "way of ideas", from which Hume draws his personal identity theory and show the alternative offered by Reid in attempt to solve the problems of humean philosophy. Finally, in the third chapter, we examine Reid's and Beattie's criticism specifically on humean notion of personal identity; criticism which, simultaneously, promote the principles of their common sense philosophy.
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spelling Sobre o problema da identidade pessoal: David Hume e seus críticosReid, Thomas, 1710-1796Senso comumHume, David, 1711-1776Beattie, James, 1735-1803FilosofiaCeticismoJames BeattieDavid HumeSenso comumIdentidade pessoalThomas ReidCeticismoOn the problem of personal identity: David Hume and his critics the problem of personal identity is, perhaps, the most polemic topic of David Hume's (1711-1776) philosophy. Three causes can be pointed: the innovation of Hume's explanation when he defines the mind as a bundle of perceptions that lacks perfect identity; the confession, in "Appendix", of dissatisfaction with his own explication and, finally, the fact that he abandons the problem in his posterior works. Scholars approaches personal identity problem by looking what is the inconsistency in the theory, acknowledged by Hume, in order to draw the real nature of his dissatisfaction. This dissertation follows a different path. Our aim is to analyze the reception of Hume's theory by two contemporarys philosophers of him: Thomas Reid (1710-1796) and James Beattie (1735-1803). Therefore, our research is primarily historical and tries to rebuild Beattie's and Reid's criticism of Hume's philosophy. Choosing these philosophers is justified for the importance of both to modern philosophical context. Representing the so-called common sense philosophy, Reid and Beattie's interpretation of Hume's philosophy - mainly in Treatise of Human Nature - contributed to a diffusion of Hume as a radical skeptic. That is why Hume releases a note denying the Treatise. Such note was characterized by Hume as "a compleat Answer to Dr. Reid and to that bigotted silly Fellow, Beattie. That said, we try, in the first chapter, to analyze personal identity explanation on Treatise's section 1.4.6 and to examine the nature of Hume's dissatisfaction confessed in the Appendix. In the second chapter, we present the common sense philosopher's criticism of the "way of ideas", from which Hume draws his personal identity theory and show the alternative offered by Reid in attempt to solve the problems of humean philosophy. Finally, in the third chapter, we examine Reid's and Beattie's criticism specifically on humean notion of personal identity; criticism which, simultaneously, promote the principles of their common sense philosophy.Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais2019-08-10T22:39:47Z2025-09-09T00:45:47Z2019-08-10T22:39:47Z2010-02-04info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUOS-8VFHMKMatheus Batista dos Reisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessporreponame:Repositório Institucional da UFMGinstname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)instacron:UFMG2025-09-09T00:45:47Zoai:repositorio.ufmg.br:1843/BUOS-8VFHMKRepositório InstitucionalPUBhttps://repositorio.ufmg.br/oairepositorio@ufmg.bropendoar:2025-09-09T00:45:47Repositório Institucional da UFMG - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Sobre o problema da identidade pessoal: David Hume e seus críticos
title Sobre o problema da identidade pessoal: David Hume e seus críticos
spellingShingle Sobre o problema da identidade pessoal: David Hume e seus críticos
Matheus Batista dos Reis
Reid, Thomas, 1710-1796
Senso comum
Hume, David, 1711-1776
Beattie, James, 1735-1803
Filosofia
Ceticismo
James Beattie
David Hume
Senso comum
Identidade pessoal
Thomas Reid
Ceticismo
title_short Sobre o problema da identidade pessoal: David Hume e seus críticos
title_full Sobre o problema da identidade pessoal: David Hume e seus críticos
title_fullStr Sobre o problema da identidade pessoal: David Hume e seus críticos
title_full_unstemmed Sobre o problema da identidade pessoal: David Hume e seus críticos
title_sort Sobre o problema da identidade pessoal: David Hume e seus críticos
author Matheus Batista dos Reis
author_facet Matheus Batista dos Reis
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Matheus Batista dos Reis
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Reid, Thomas, 1710-1796
Senso comum
Hume, David, 1711-1776
Beattie, James, 1735-1803
Filosofia
Ceticismo
James Beattie
David Hume
Senso comum
Identidade pessoal
Thomas Reid
Ceticismo
topic Reid, Thomas, 1710-1796
Senso comum
Hume, David, 1711-1776
Beattie, James, 1735-1803
Filosofia
Ceticismo
James Beattie
David Hume
Senso comum
Identidade pessoal
Thomas Reid
Ceticismo
description On the problem of personal identity: David Hume and his critics the problem of personal identity is, perhaps, the most polemic topic of David Hume's (1711-1776) philosophy. Three causes can be pointed: the innovation of Hume's explanation when he defines the mind as a bundle of perceptions that lacks perfect identity; the confession, in "Appendix", of dissatisfaction with his own explication and, finally, the fact that he abandons the problem in his posterior works. Scholars approaches personal identity problem by looking what is the inconsistency in the theory, acknowledged by Hume, in order to draw the real nature of his dissatisfaction. This dissertation follows a different path. Our aim is to analyze the reception of Hume's theory by two contemporarys philosophers of him: Thomas Reid (1710-1796) and James Beattie (1735-1803). Therefore, our research is primarily historical and tries to rebuild Beattie's and Reid's criticism of Hume's philosophy. Choosing these philosophers is justified for the importance of both to modern philosophical context. Representing the so-called common sense philosophy, Reid and Beattie's interpretation of Hume's philosophy - mainly in Treatise of Human Nature - contributed to a diffusion of Hume as a radical skeptic. That is why Hume releases a note denying the Treatise. Such note was characterized by Hume as "a compleat Answer to Dr. Reid and to that bigotted silly Fellow, Beattie. That said, we try, in the first chapter, to analyze personal identity explanation on Treatise's section 1.4.6 and to examine the nature of Hume's dissatisfaction confessed in the Appendix. In the second chapter, we present the common sense philosopher's criticism of the "way of ideas", from which Hume draws his personal identity theory and show the alternative offered by Reid in attempt to solve the problems of humean philosophy. Finally, in the third chapter, we examine Reid's and Beattie's criticism specifically on humean notion of personal identity; criticism which, simultaneously, promote the principles of their common sense philosophy.
publishDate 2010
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2010-02-04
2019-08-10T22:39:47Z
2019-08-10T22:39:47Z
2025-09-09T00:45:47Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFMG
instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
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instname_str Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
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reponame_str Repositório Institucional da UFMG
collection Repositório Institucional da UFMG
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Institucional da UFMG - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv repositorio@ufmg.br
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