Relações executivo-legislativo no presidencialismo de coalizão brasileiro: emendas individuais como ferramenta de barganha no governo Temer

• Ano de defesa: 2019
• Autor(a) principal: Caio Túlio Guimarães de Souza
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais; Brasil; FAF - DEPARTAMENTO DE CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política; UFMG
• Palavras-chave em Português: Presidencialismo de coalizão; Relações Executivo-Legislativo; Emendas individuais; Relações executivo-legislativo
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/1843/30895

This dissertation aims at revisiting a research problem already treated by brasilian and brasilianist academic literature, but yet without a consensus: are the individual amendments to the budget used as bargaining tools to buy the supportof the legislators by the Executive? We benefit from the novelty of the Amendments Impositive Budget (which constitutionalised the mandatory budgetary and financial execution of the individual amendaments), from the related availability of public and beliveable data sets with individualized data of amendaments execution, and from the theoretical and methodological accumulation to carefully investigate the question that guide us. The time span analised comprehends the 25 months between june 2016 and june 2018, wich cover almost entirely Michel Temer’s government. We use control variables not only for the safe of the inference produced about the key explanatory variable, but also to test correlated hypothesis, like the ones that suggest that legislators with geographically concentrated constituency or with intermediary ideological distance from the government are more likely to take part in the bargain with amendments. The descriptive analysis and the estatistical models suggest that pork may not be the main explanation for the high support rates obtained by Temer. In addition, and in a perplexing manner, we verify a intertemporal dynamic between the variables that disrupt entirely with what has been verified in previous works: pork has negative effect over support on the first two months and has positive effect only on the second month after the payment, and this effect is narrow, much smaller than the one of the traditional coalition goods. This findings brings relevant contributions to some of the questions and hypothesis used to explain the Executive-Legislative Relations in brazilian multiparty (“coalitional”) presidentialism and keep some others form diferente research fields clamoring for attention.