Burocracias em ação: múltiplos atores, estratégias e conflitos na regulação federal de agrotóxicos

• Ano de defesa: 2012
• Autor(a) principal: Campos, Luiz Claudio Marques
• Orientador(a): Pacheco, Regina Silvia Viotto Monteiro
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Palavras-chave em Português: Burocracia; Regulação; Agrotóxicos; Controle político da burocracia; Fontes do poder burocrático
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/9724

This research analyzes the role of bureaucracy in the implementation of public policies, given an environment of multiple principals, stakeholders and agents, through a case study on the federal regulation of pesticides, attributed to three different agencies. The theoretical framework was built based on theories of political control of bureaucracy, theories of sources of bureaucratic power and the literature on public policy implementation. The way the legislation was built and the level of complexity of the policy give the agencies exclusive mandates and numerous spaces for autonomy, while requiring them to decide in a consensual way. Bureaucracies adopt several strategies to minimize the information asymmetry and moral hazard from the regulated sector. The political principals make use of several instruments to impose their preferences, but they do it superficially or sporadically. The low effectiveness of this influence is best explained by the principals’ own limitations than by the resistance of the agents. Courts and Public Prosecution Service may be important partners or veto points to agencies´ regulatory action. The managers' leadership style and the vision of what should be the role of bureaucracy in a regulatory policy help to explain the differences observed in agencies with regard to seeking alliances and strategic action towards the other actors.