Interesses difusos na teoria jurídica: conflituosidade e jurisdicionalização da política

• Ano de defesa: 2007
• Autor(a) principal: Zapater, Tiago Cardoso
• Orientador(a): Yoshida, Consuelo Yatsuda Moromizato
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
• Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Estudos Pós-Graduados em Direito
• Departamento: Faculdade de Direito
• País: BR
• Palavras-chave em Português: Direitos difusos; Teoria jurídica; Direito > Filosofia; Interesses difusos; Sociologia juridica
• Área do conhecimento CNPq: CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::DIREITO
• Link de acesso: https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/7765

The fundamental premise of the present work says that the diffuse interests theoretic and dogmatic instances are attached to sociological and filosofical premises that one cant hold before complex society. Paradoxally, while the theory of diffuse interest is strongly supported by sociological premises (as the concept of mass society), the dogmatism of it s methodology tends to substitute the observation of law in society (and of the society in which the law operates) for a values and principles rhetoric, which does not comply with representing the complexity of a society that does not count with any external order of values or an unmistakable instance for interests representation. Once law s theoretical instances (which supports dogmatic legal constructions) does not count with an epistemological instance, which enables them to observe the limits of the legal system that they observe in society (before other social systems), dogmatic legal science loses its capability of offering legal criteria for judicial legal decision. The control of what is and what isn t law is projected to the diffuse interests formulation instance: the political system. This state of affairs makes the legal system start to operate with political criteria (such as proportionality and reasonability), allowing the use of the legal system for the activation and justification of political programs that violate other rights and interests. This question is strictly attached to the inherent conflictuality of the diffuse interests, which reflects a political participation conflict (capacity of influence other s decisions) over an indivisible interest (and not a conflict between opposite interests, as usually thought). Whenever this conflictuality is brought to judicial decision while its nature still political (which leads to court politization) and the operational limits between the legal and political systems are not observed, interests that count which little political force, before other interests which seems to be the case of some diffuse interests before economical interests ends loosing legal protection. That is to say, the more Politics is brought to judicial decisions and the more Justice is politized, bigger is the tendency towards lost of legal protection to interests which counts with little political force, which reflects the legal system s loosing of autonomy, that is, the lost of the capability of controlling it s own code (right/unright), which exclusivity functionality differentiates it in society (legal problems must be solved legally). Other consequence from this state of affairs, for which legal doctrine shows little concern, is that, brought to the level of fundamental rights, diffuse rights loses its capacity of legally protecting the individual against the State s intervention and become a mechanism for activate and legitimate State intervention to comply with diffuse interests, politically defined, suspending or violating other different rights