Sentimentos morais e o conceito de justiça na filosofia moral de David Hume

• Ano de defesa: 2014
• Autor(a) principal: Andrade, Pedro Fior Mota de
• Orientador(a): Araújo, Marcelo de
• Banca de defesa: Araújo, Luiz Bernardo Leite , Shecaira, Fábio Perin
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro
• Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
• Departamento: Centro de Ciências Sociais::Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
• País: BR
• Palavras-chave em Português: Ética; Filosofia política; Sentimentalismo; Justiça; David Hume; Hume, David, 1711-1776; Justiça (Filosofia)
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Ethics; Political philosophy; Sentimentalism; Justice; David Hume
• Área do conhecimento CNPq: CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/handle/1/12264

This dissertation aims to describe and critically analyze the concept of justice in the context of David Hume s moral philosophy. In order to provide a complete and consistent account of his theory of justice, I intend to present Hume s sentimentalist moral theory and explain how his conception of justice relates with the fundamental principles of morality. The first chapter of the dissertation consists, in first place, in a short exposition of the problem of free-will and determinism and, in second place, in a presentation of Hume s compatibilist alternative. As I intend to show throughout the chapter, the strategy of Hume s compatibilist solution should necessarily involve the notion of moral sentiment, whose concept is central in his moral system. Then, in the second chapter it will be examined Hume s moral theory, which is structured in two main hypotheses: the negative thesis that rejects the idea that the foundation of morality is based exclusively on the operations of reason (relations of ideas and matters of facts); and the positive thesis that affirms that the source of morality lies in our passions, sentiments and affections of pleasure and pain when we contemplate virtuous and vicious characters. The third chapter aims to present Hume s theory of justice, the main subject of this dissertation. The central hypothesis advanced by Hume is that the virtue of justice is not instinctive or natural in the human beings. It is only possible through human agreements, conventions and artifices motivated by self-interest. Hume s thesis is precisely that the origin of justice, as a social convention, can be only explained based on two factors: the operation of the sentiments of our internal disposition and the external circumstances of relative scarcity of material goods. Finally, the last chapter of this dissertation aims to discuss Hume s political theory in order to supplement his theory of justice. Hume claims that the justification of the institution of the sovereign authority and the civil obligations are grounded in the same principles held in the convention of justice: they are also artifices created solely to serve our own interests.