Contraexemplos de Gettier: repensando a justificação epistêmica
Ano de defesa: | 2016 |
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Autor(a) principal: | |
Orientador(a): | |
Banca de defesa: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
Tipo de acesso: | Acesso aberto |
Idioma: | por |
Instituição de defesa: |
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria
|
Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
|
Departamento: |
Filosofia
|
País: |
BR
|
Palavras-chave em Português: | |
Palavras-chave em Inglês: | |
Área do conhecimento CNPq: | |
Link de acesso: | http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9164 |
Resumo: | In the 1960s, a debate has begun in Epistemology about a problem raised by Edmund Gettier in relation to the traditional conception of knowledge. Nowadays the cases presented by Gettier don t seem resolved what makes them even more relevant in current epistemological debates. According to these cases, some scenarios are possible in which necessary and sufficient conditions (belief, truth and justification) are satisfied in order to the traditional definition of knowledge. However, in these cases the subject (a candidate for knowledge) isn t in possession of knowledge. The mainly discussions about it are relative to the concept of epistemic justification, because justification, as an element that identifies the truth of a belief, is supposed not to be sufficient to carry on this function. This insufficiency allows, therefore, the subject be in possession of justification for her/his beliefs and, at the same time, have no knowledge yet. Gettier cases are considered a problem by some theories that defend the standard conditions to the definition of concept of knowledge. Many efforts have been tried to solve these cases with the establishment of an anti-Gettier condition to the definition of knowledge. This way of solution takes to the development of some theories of justification subjected to additional Gettier cases. Unlike this, Laurence Bonjour publishes a critic called The Myth of Knowledge, in which Gettier cases are read like some epistemological pseudoproblems. Bonjour defends that such cases and also the Lottery Paradox are introduced to Epistemology as a result of the adoption of a fallibilist view of knowledge, particularly in relation to the concept of justification. According to him, fallibilists have been failed in their efforts to solve Gettier cases and, hence, they have been complicated the possibility of a coherent concept of knowledge. Furthermore, a mistake in relation to support a fallible justification involves a myth, namely, a worthy philosophical conception of knowledge that can be found in common sense. The fallibilist view, consonant Bonjour, is philosophically unsustainable. His suggestion concerns the abandonment of the myth, because only with this way epistemological pseudoproblems would be dissolved, like those problems set by Gettier counterexamples. |
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2016-10-142016-10-142016-03-31SILVA, Kariane Marques da. GETTIER COUNTEREXAMPLES: RECONSIDERING EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION. 2016. 60 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria, 2016.http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9164In the 1960s, a debate has begun in Epistemology about a problem raised by Edmund Gettier in relation to the traditional conception of knowledge. Nowadays the cases presented by Gettier don t seem resolved what makes them even more relevant in current epistemological debates. According to these cases, some scenarios are possible in which necessary and sufficient conditions (belief, truth and justification) are satisfied in order to the traditional definition of knowledge. However, in these cases the subject (a candidate for knowledge) isn t in possession of knowledge. The mainly discussions about it are relative to the concept of epistemic justification, because justification, as an element that identifies the truth of a belief, is supposed not to be sufficient to carry on this function. This insufficiency allows, therefore, the subject be in possession of justification for her/his beliefs and, at the same time, have no knowledge yet. Gettier cases are considered a problem by some theories that defend the standard conditions to the definition of concept of knowledge. Many efforts have been tried to solve these cases with the establishment of an anti-Gettier condition to the definition of knowledge. This way of solution takes to the development of some theories of justification subjected to additional Gettier cases. Unlike this, Laurence Bonjour publishes a critic called The Myth of Knowledge, in which Gettier cases are read like some epistemological pseudoproblems. Bonjour defends that such cases and also the Lottery Paradox are introduced to Epistemology as a result of the adoption of a fallibilist view of knowledge, particularly in relation to the concept of justification. According to him, fallibilists have been failed in their efforts to solve Gettier cases and, hence, they have been complicated the possibility of a coherent concept of knowledge. Furthermore, a mistake in relation to support a fallible justification involves a myth, namely, a worthy philosophical conception of knowledge that can be found in common sense. The fallibilist view, consonant Bonjour, is philosophically unsustainable. His suggestion concerns the abandonment of the myth, because only with this way epistemological pseudoproblems would be dissolved, like those problems set by Gettier counterexamples.Na década de 60, inicia-se um debate, no âmbito epistemológico, em torno de um suposto problema proposto por Edmund Gettier a respeito da definição tradicional de conhecimento. Até a atualidade, os casos apresentados por Gettier parecem não ter sido resolvidos, o que torna a discussão relevante nos atuais debates epistemológicos. De acordo com esses casos, é possível postular cenários em que as condições (crença, verdade e justificação) necessárias e suficientes para a definição tradicional de conhecimento são satisfeitas; entretanto, o sujeito, candidato a conhecedor, não está de posse de conhecimento. As principais discussões sobre isso ocorrem em torno do conceito de justificação epistêmica, pois se supõe que a justificação, entendida como o elemento que identifica a verdade da crença, não é suficiente para realizar essa função; permitindo, assim, situações em que o sujeito esteja de posse de justificação para suas crenças e, mesmo assim, não tenha conhecimento. Para as teorias que mantêm as condições-padrão para a definição do conceito de conhecimento, os casos de Gettier são postos como um problema, e muitas tentativas de superá-lo acontecem por meio do estabelecimento de uma condição anti-Gettier para a definição de conhecimento. Essa via de solução leva ao desenvolvimento de teorias da justificação que incorrem em adicionais casos de tipo-Gettier. Diferentemente disso, Laurence BonJour publicou uma crítica denominada O Mito do Conhecimento, em que os casos de Gettier são entendidos como pseudoproblemas epistemológicos. BonJour argumenta que tais casos, e também o Paradoxo da Loteria, são introduzidos à epistemologia como resultado da adoção de uma visão falibilista do conhecimento, particularmente com relação ao conceito de justificação. O que se evidencia é que os falibilistas têm fracassado nas tentativas de soluções para casos tipo-Gettier, e com isso inviabilizam a possibilidade de um conceito coerente de conhecimento. O equívoco da sustentação de uma justificação falível para o conhecimento radica num mito, a saber, que pode ser encontrado no senso comum uma concepção de conhecimento que seja digna de preocupação filosófica. Para BonJour essa visão falibilista do conhecimento é filosoficamente insustentável. Sua sugestão é de que se abandone o mito que a sustenta, pois somente assim se dissolveriam os pseudoproblemas epistemológicos, como aqueles engendrados pelos contraexemplos de Gettier.Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superiorapplication/pdfporUniversidade Federal de Santa MariaPrograma de Pós-Graduação em FilosofiaUFSMBRFilosofiaConhecimentoJustificaçãoEdmund GettierLaurence BonJourKnowledgeJustificationEdmund GettierLaurence BonJourCNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIAContraexemplos de Gettier: repensando a justificação epistêmicaGettier counterexamples: reconsidering epistemic justificationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisGallina, Albertinho Luizhttp://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4797014A6Luz, Alexandre Meyerhttp://lattes.cnpq.br/0299421437669387Sartori, Carlos Augustohttp://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4708889E0http://lattes.cnpq.br/8617145523595968Silva, Kariane Marques da7001000000044005003003003006dd1762b-d15e-4dab-bf93-1ae6494c41bf686ca9dd-bfdc-477e-b1e3-7e61d224165937d565eb-6b2d-4ded-8635-6c63007a8aad420dd786-5b10-4117-a3b4-a2cabe1b2830info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações do UFSMinstname:Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)instacron:UFSMORIGINALSILVA, KARIANE MARQUES DA.pdfapplication/pdf611972http://repositorio.ufsm.br/bitstream/1/9164/1/SILVA%2c%20KARIANE%20MARQUES%20DA.pdf530b6975abe37fc49d2cd015779181a6MD51TEXTSILVA, KARIANE MARQUES DA.pdf.txtSILVA, KARIANE MARQUES DA.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain146787http://repositorio.ufsm.br/bitstream/1/9164/2/SILVA%2c%20KARIANE%20MARQUES%20DA.pdf.txt88f9d5150e09b0778728c8b389f00615MD52THUMBNAILSILVA, KARIANE MARQUES DA.pdf.jpgSILVA, KARIANE MARQUES DA.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg4089http://repositorio.ufsm.br/bitstream/1/9164/3/SILVA%2c%20KARIANE%20MARQUES%20DA.pdf.jpgbceed0e4035c9891083601c868bdf092MD531/91642022-03-16 14:27:50.444oai:repositorio.ufsm.br:1/9164Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertaçõeshttps://repositorio.ufsm.br/ONGhttps://repositorio.ufsm.br/oai/requestatendimento.sib@ufsm.br||tedebc@gmail.comopendoar:2022-03-16T17:27:50Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações do UFSM - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)false |
dc.title.por.fl_str_mv |
Contraexemplos de Gettier: repensando a justificação epistêmica |
dc.title.alternative.eng.fl_str_mv |
Gettier counterexamples: reconsidering epistemic justification |
title |
Contraexemplos de Gettier: repensando a justificação epistêmica |
spellingShingle |
Contraexemplos de Gettier: repensando a justificação epistêmica Silva, Kariane Marques da Conhecimento Justificação Edmund Gettier Laurence BonJour Knowledge Justification Edmund Gettier Laurence BonJour CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
title_short |
Contraexemplos de Gettier: repensando a justificação epistêmica |
title_full |
Contraexemplos de Gettier: repensando a justificação epistêmica |
title_fullStr |
Contraexemplos de Gettier: repensando a justificação epistêmica |
title_full_unstemmed |
Contraexemplos de Gettier: repensando a justificação epistêmica |
title_sort |
Contraexemplos de Gettier: repensando a justificação epistêmica |
author |
Silva, Kariane Marques da |
author_facet |
Silva, Kariane Marques da |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv |
Gallina, Albertinho Luiz |
dc.contributor.advisor1Lattes.fl_str_mv |
http://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4797014A6 |
dc.contributor.referee1.fl_str_mv |
Luz, Alexandre Meyer |
dc.contributor.referee1Lattes.fl_str_mv |
http://lattes.cnpq.br/0299421437669387 |
dc.contributor.referee2.fl_str_mv |
Sartori, Carlos Augusto |
dc.contributor.referee2Lattes.fl_str_mv |
http://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4708889E0 |
dc.contributor.authorLattes.fl_str_mv |
http://lattes.cnpq.br/8617145523595968 |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Silva, Kariane Marques da |
contributor_str_mv |
Gallina, Albertinho Luiz Luz, Alexandre Meyer Sartori, Carlos Augusto |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Conhecimento Justificação Edmund Gettier Laurence BonJour |
topic |
Conhecimento Justificação Edmund Gettier Laurence BonJour Knowledge Justification Edmund Gettier Laurence BonJour CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv |
Knowledge Justification Edmund Gettier Laurence BonJour |
dc.subject.cnpq.fl_str_mv |
CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
description |
In the 1960s, a debate has begun in Epistemology about a problem raised by Edmund Gettier in relation to the traditional conception of knowledge. Nowadays the cases presented by Gettier don t seem resolved what makes them even more relevant in current epistemological debates. According to these cases, some scenarios are possible in which necessary and sufficient conditions (belief, truth and justification) are satisfied in order to the traditional definition of knowledge. However, in these cases the subject (a candidate for knowledge) isn t in possession of knowledge. The mainly discussions about it are relative to the concept of epistemic justification, because justification, as an element that identifies the truth of a belief, is supposed not to be sufficient to carry on this function. This insufficiency allows, therefore, the subject be in possession of justification for her/his beliefs and, at the same time, have no knowledge yet. Gettier cases are considered a problem by some theories that defend the standard conditions to the definition of concept of knowledge. Many efforts have been tried to solve these cases with the establishment of an anti-Gettier condition to the definition of knowledge. This way of solution takes to the development of some theories of justification subjected to additional Gettier cases. Unlike this, Laurence Bonjour publishes a critic called The Myth of Knowledge, in which Gettier cases are read like some epistemological pseudoproblems. Bonjour defends that such cases and also the Lottery Paradox are introduced to Epistemology as a result of the adoption of a fallibilist view of knowledge, particularly in relation to the concept of justification. According to him, fallibilists have been failed in their efforts to solve Gettier cases and, hence, they have been complicated the possibility of a coherent concept of knowledge. Furthermore, a mistake in relation to support a fallible justification involves a myth, namely, a worthy philosophical conception of knowledge that can be found in common sense. The fallibilist view, consonant Bonjour, is philosophically unsustainable. His suggestion concerns the abandonment of the myth, because only with this way epistemological pseudoproblems would be dissolved, like those problems set by Gettier counterexamples. |
publishDate |
2016 |
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2016-10-14 |
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2016-10-14 |
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2016-03-31 |
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SILVA, Kariane Marques da. GETTIER COUNTEREXAMPLES: RECONSIDERING EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION. 2016. 60 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria, 2016. |
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http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9164 |
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SILVA, Kariane Marques da. GETTIER COUNTEREXAMPLES: RECONSIDERING EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION. 2016. 60 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria, 2016. |
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