Ceticismo e anticeticismo: um estudo a partir do princípio de fechamento epistêmico

• Ano de defesa: 2012
• Autor(a) principal: Zarth, Fernando Henrique Faustini
• Orientador(a): Sartori, Carlos Augusto
• Banca de defesa: Gallina, Albertinho Luiz , Luz, Alexandre Meyer
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Santa Maria
• Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
• Departamento: Filosofia
• País: BR
• Palavras-chave em Português: Ceticismo; Fechamento epistêmico; Justificação epistêmica; Conhecimento; Epistemologia
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Skepticism; Principle of epistemic closure; Epistemic justification; Knowledge; Epistemology
• Área do conhecimento CNPq: CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9115

The identification and analysis of epistemic principles have enabled significant gains in the study of skepticism in recent decades; this does not mean that we are near a consensus about which principles should be accepted. Taking p for any proposition that we normally accept to be known, like here is a hand , and h for a skeptical scenario such p is not true, but just a illusion projected in my mind , the skeptical argument can be formalized as follows: (1) If S knows that p, then S knows that ~h; (2) S doesn t know that ~h, then (3) S doesn t know that p. The first chapter of this text presents a comprehensive analysis of this argument, where is pointed out that its cogency can be defended from a valid version of the epistemic closure principle. The second chapter deals with the antiskeptical strategy advocated by Fred Dretske, which attempts to refute the skeptic arguing against its first premise, by rejecting the closure principle. At the end of this chapter, it is argued that the Dretske's arguments fail to fulfill their goal, collapsing in the face of relevant objections. Finally, the third chapter examines the answer to the skeptic presented by Peter Klein. Based on a more sophisticated understanding of the epistemic closure principle, Klein suggests that the skeptic cannot build a plausible argument for (2). It is argued that this analysis of the problem is adequate and resists criticism of his objectors.