Impactos de regras institucionais na restrição orçamentária dos estados brasileiros

• Ano de defesa: 2010
• Autor(a) principal: Nazareth, Marcos Spínola
• Orientador(a): Lírio, Viviani Silva
• Banca de defesa: Dias, Roberto Serpa , Abrantes, Luiz Antônio , Toyoshima, Sílvia Harumi
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Viçosa
• Programa de Pós-Graduação: Mestrado em Economia Aplicada
• Departamento: Economia e Gerenciamento do Agronegócio; Economia das Relações Internacionais; Economia dos Recursos
• País: BR
• Palavras-chave em Português: Nova economia institucional; Federalismo fiscal; Dados em painel
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: New institutional economics; Fiscal federalism; Panel data
• Área do conhecimento CNPq: CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ECONOMIA::ECONOMIA MONETARIA E FISCAL::FINANCAS PUBLICAS INTERNAS
• Link de acesso: http://locus.ufv.br/handle/123456789/36

The federative relations involving transfers, financial bailouts, and laws between the Union and the states underlie the agents’ incentive structure, inserting them into an environment of collective action. The collective action issues considered in this work were those related to the Samaritan’s Dilemma and Moral Hazard, that emerge into a federative system in which the government’s lower spheres are highly dependent on the resources from the government’s higher spheres, either regular (constitutional transfers) or periodic (financial bailouts), as is the case of the Brazilian system. The literature based on the second generation of the theory of fiscal federalism has defended in the last years the idea that imposing a hard restriction constraint to the sub-national governments is a sine qua non condition for the solution of these problems. This work aimed to understand, by using panel data, the effects of institutional rules on the budget constraint of Brazilian states and their possible effects on the incentive structure of the Brazilian federalism and consequent impact on the resolution of the collective action issues. The results show that the state CEOs, overall, do not have the incentives necessary to help them face a hard budget constraint. The institutional rules tend to relax the budget constraint of the states, or to increase the expenditures to socially undesirable levels, with everything else being maintained constant. In other words, the collective action issues will not be solved or minimized. Thus, the political suggestions are clear: it is necessary to implement hard budget constraints to the Brazilian federalism with laws and reforms that eliminate the Union’s role as insurer or co-signer of the states’ finances, increasing the participation of proper revenues in the regional budget, strengthening the link between the tax-payer and public expenditure and decreasing the importance of intra- governmental transfer, eliminating the perverse incentives applied for the expansion of expenditures beyond that established by budget constraint. Budget institutes with credibility along time must be fixed. It is necessary to reach a sufficiently stable political voting system to achieve a federal system that favors a hard budget constraint.