Contratos entre produtores de soja da agricultura familiar e indústria de biodiesel: uma aplicação do modelo principal-agente

• Ano de defesa: 2012
• Autor(a) principal: Clemente, Felippe
• Orientador(a): Silva Júnior, Aziz Galvão da
• Banca de defesa: Leite, Carlos Antonio Moreira , Perez, Ronaldo , Vieira, Wilson da Cruz
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Viçosa
• Programa de Pós-Graduação: Mestrado em Economia Aplicada
• Departamento: Economia e Gerenciamento do Agronegócio; Economia das Relações Internacionais; Economia dos Recursos
• País: BR
• Palavras-chave em Português: Contratos agrícolas; Modelo principal-agente; Soja
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Agricultural contracts; Principal-agent model; Soybean
• Área do conhecimento CNPq: CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ECONOMIA::ECONOMIAS AGRARIA E DOS RECURSOS NATURAIS::ECONOMIA AGRARIA
• Link de acesso: http://locus.ufv.br/handle/123456789/65

The asymmetry of information found in the chain of production of biodiesel in the relationship between farmers and Biodiesel Company, was discussed by the principal-agent theoretical model. By analyzing the contracts used for trading soybeans in the Midwest and southern Brazil, one notices the absence of an incentive structure that encourages small farmers to achieve high effort, allowing the agent the practice of moral hazard in trading via PNPB contracts. In order to minimize this obstacle, drew up an incentive structure using the logic of non-linear programming in order to maximize revenue from small producer of soybeans. In addition, we used the Principal-Agent approach to verify that these new incentives to enable small producers make high effort. In assessing the incentive structure, using the first model, the result indicates that both the small farmer as a producer of soy Biodiesel Company will have maximized their profits with the action of high effort by the farmer. The second model shows that, although the contract without incentives and subsidies stimulate higher stresses, the acceptance of contact proposed by the company is subject to the state of nature, which would make the negotiation unstable in the long run. It has, therefore, that a contract with incentives is a great tool to induce farmers to produce high effort. Thus, it is clear that the public agency responsible for overseeing the contract farming PNPB could insert this mechanism to stimulate increased productivity of family agriculture in regulations that regulate the inclusion of small biodiesel producer in the chain in order to contribute to competitiveness this chain of biofuel in Brazil.