Rent seeking and business organizations: an explanatory study of business organization’s role during Brazil’s trade liberalization era

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2017
Autor(a) principal: Bouyer, Timothee Francois Marie Andre
Orientador(a): Pacheco, Julia Alice Sophia von Maltzan
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: eng
Instituição de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Não Informado pela instituição
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: Não Informado pela instituição
Palavras-chave em Português:
Palavras-chave em Inglês:
Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/18189
Resumo: Brazil partially shifted from state-led development to market economy following its switch to democracy. This affected the economy in two ways: first the state initiated a wave of privatization in the wake of the fiscal crisis under President Collor. Second, the economy started opening up to international competition through the enactment of certain trade reforms. However, the economy still displays erratic levels of protectionism. The literature on rent seeking argues that organized interest groups devote resources to capture and try to influence and neutralize the liberalization of the economy, which would endanger the rents they benefit from under existing rules. After decades of state nurturing under the ISI model, the business sector in Brazil was crucial to shaping the path for a new growth model. However, their role in promoting trade openness was far more nuanced. The present work looks at business groups in Brazil since the second half of the twentieth century and the role they played before and during the transition and how their opposition to trade reforms suggests potential rentseeking behaviors. The transition to democracy witnessed the emergence of new business organizations with independent actions that I will account for in this paper. Business organizations were not united at the time of economic reforms and thus reacted differently according to the interests of their members. Institutional factors, amongst which the rise of a new civil society, as well as conjectural factors further constrained the path of economic reforms.
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spelling Bouyer, Timothee Francois Marie AndreEscolas::EAESPSilva, Marcos Fernandes Gonçalves daPires, Jorge OliveiraPacheco, Julia Alice Sophia von Maltzan2017-04-20T12:08:45Z2017-04-20T12:08:45Z2017-03-13BOUYER, Timothee Francois Marie Andre. Rent seeking and business organizations: an explanatory study of business organization’s role during Brazil’s trade liberalization era. Dissertação (Mestrado Profissional em Gestão Internacional) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, São Paulo, 2017.http://hdl.handle.net/10438/18189Brazil partially shifted from state-led development to market economy following its switch to democracy. This affected the economy in two ways: first the state initiated a wave of privatization in the wake of the fiscal crisis under President Collor. Second, the economy started opening up to international competition through the enactment of certain trade reforms. However, the economy still displays erratic levels of protectionism. The literature on rent seeking argues that organized interest groups devote resources to capture and try to influence and neutralize the liberalization of the economy, which would endanger the rents they benefit from under existing rules. After decades of state nurturing under the ISI model, the business sector in Brazil was crucial to shaping the path for a new growth model. However, their role in promoting trade openness was far more nuanced. The present work looks at business groups in Brazil since the second half of the twentieth century and the role they played before and during the transition and how their opposition to trade reforms suggests potential rentseeking behaviors. The transition to democracy witnessed the emergence of new business organizations with independent actions that I will account for in this paper. Business organizations were not united at the time of economic reforms and thus reacted differently according to the interests of their members. Institutional factors, amongst which the rise of a new civil society, as well as conjectural factors further constrained the path of economic reforms.O Brasil sofreu uma parcial mudança, do desenvolvimento estatal à economia de mercado, em seguimento à sua transição à democracia. A economia abriu-se para o comércio internacional, mas ainda hoje apresenta níveis erráticos de protecionismo. O fenômeno da rent-seeking (“busca de renda”) destaca a tentativa de grupos organizados em captar recursos estatais para atividades improdutivas. Como consequência direta, este fenômeno dificulta a realização de reformas comerciais, como grupos de pressão organizados (lobbies), com o fim de proteger os seus próprios interesses. Depois de décadas de modelo de industrialização via substituição de importações (ISI model) incentivado pelo Estado, o setor de negócios no Brasil demonstrou-se crucial para moldar o caminho em direção a reformas econômicas. O presente trabalho analisa o papel desenvolvido pelos grupos empresariais, antes e durante esta transição, e examina como a sua oposição a abertura econômica sugere provável busca de renda. Este trabalho argumenta que as limitações da estrutura corporativa combinadas com o surgimento de novos grupos de pressão, concorrentes entre si, fragmentou a intermediação de interesses. Paradoxalmente, essa fragmentação de interesses e fraqueza coletiva de grupos de pressões limitou os obstáculos as reformas econômicas. O surgimento de uma nova sociedade civil e os fatores institucionais do regime democrático são outros fatores quem dificultaram a criação de reformas econômicas.engRent seekingBusiness organizationsCollective actionTrade liberalizationBusca de rendaAção coletivaOrganizações empresariaisLiberalização do comércioCiência políticaSetor privado - Brasil - Relações com o governoDesenvolvimento econômico - BrasilCabala políticaGrupos de pressãoRent seeking and business organizations: an explanatory study of business organization’s role during Brazil’s trade liberalization erainfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVTEXTFGV Final revised version 19_04.pdf.txtFGV Final revised version 19_04.pdf.txtExtracted 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dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv Rent seeking and business organizations: an explanatory study of business organization’s role during Brazil’s trade liberalization era
title Rent seeking and business organizations: an explanatory study of business organization’s role during Brazil’s trade liberalization era
spellingShingle Rent seeking and business organizations: an explanatory study of business organization’s role during Brazil’s trade liberalization era
Bouyer, Timothee Francois Marie Andre
Rent seeking
Business organizations
Collective action
Trade liberalization
Busca de renda
Ação coletiva
Organizações empresariais
Liberalização do comércio
Ciência política
Setor privado - Brasil - Relações com o governo
Desenvolvimento econômico - Brasil
Cabala política
Grupos de pressão
title_short Rent seeking and business organizations: an explanatory study of business organization’s role during Brazil’s trade liberalization era
title_full Rent seeking and business organizations: an explanatory study of business organization’s role during Brazil’s trade liberalization era
title_fullStr Rent seeking and business organizations: an explanatory study of business organization’s role during Brazil’s trade liberalization era
title_full_unstemmed Rent seeking and business organizations: an explanatory study of business organization’s role during Brazil’s trade liberalization era
title_sort Rent seeking and business organizations: an explanatory study of business organization’s role during Brazil’s trade liberalization era
author Bouyer, Timothee Francois Marie Andre
author_facet Bouyer, Timothee Francois Marie Andre
author_role author
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv Escolas::EAESP
dc.contributor.member.none.fl_str_mv Silva, Marcos Fernandes Gonçalves da
Pires, Jorge Oliveira
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Bouyer, Timothee Francois Marie Andre
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv Pacheco, Julia Alice Sophia von Maltzan
contributor_str_mv Pacheco, Julia Alice Sophia von Maltzan
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv Rent seeking
Business organizations
Collective action
Trade liberalization
topic Rent seeking
Business organizations
Collective action
Trade liberalization
Busca de renda
Ação coletiva
Organizações empresariais
Liberalização do comércio
Ciência política
Setor privado - Brasil - Relações com o governo
Desenvolvimento econômico - Brasil
Cabala política
Grupos de pressão
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Busca de renda
Ação coletiva
Organizações empresariais
Liberalização do comércio
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv Ciência política
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv Setor privado - Brasil - Relações com o governo
Desenvolvimento econômico - Brasil
Cabala política
Grupos de pressão
description Brazil partially shifted from state-led development to market economy following its switch to democracy. This affected the economy in two ways: first the state initiated a wave of privatization in the wake of the fiscal crisis under President Collor. Second, the economy started opening up to international competition through the enactment of certain trade reforms. However, the economy still displays erratic levels of protectionism. The literature on rent seeking argues that organized interest groups devote resources to capture and try to influence and neutralize the liberalization of the economy, which would endanger the rents they benefit from under existing rules. After decades of state nurturing under the ISI model, the business sector in Brazil was crucial to shaping the path for a new growth model. However, their role in promoting trade openness was far more nuanced. The present work looks at business groups in Brazil since the second half of the twentieth century and the role they played before and during the transition and how their opposition to trade reforms suggests potential rentseeking behaviors. The transition to democracy witnessed the emergence of new business organizations with independent actions that I will account for in this paper. Business organizations were not united at the time of economic reforms and thus reacted differently according to the interests of their members. Institutional factors, amongst which the rise of a new civil society, as well as conjectural factors further constrained the path of economic reforms.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2017-04-20T12:08:45Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2017-04-20T12:08:45Z
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2017-03-13
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
format masterThesis
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.citation.fl_str_mv BOUYER, Timothee Francois Marie Andre. Rent seeking and business organizations: an explanatory study of business organization’s role during Brazil’s trade liberalization era. Dissertação (Mestrado Profissional em Gestão Internacional) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, São Paulo, 2017.
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10438/18189
identifier_str_mv BOUYER, Timothee Francois Marie Andre. Rent seeking and business organizations: an explanatory study of business organization’s role during Brazil’s trade liberalization era. Dissertação (Mestrado Profissional em Gestão Internacional) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, São Paulo, 2017.
url http://hdl.handle.net/10438/18189
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV
instname_str Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron_str FGV
institution FGV
reponame_str Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
collection Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
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