Transparência da comissão de corretagem na intermediação do seguro automóvel: um estudo comparado e lições para o Brasil

• Ano de defesa: 2016
• Autor(a) principal: Sasaki, Luiz Fernando Hideichi
• Orientador(a): Michener, Robert Gregory
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Palavras-chave em Português: Intermediação de seguro; Regulação; Transparência; Comissão de corretagem; Teoria da agência; Assimetria de informação; Conflito de interesses
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Auto insurance; Insurance intermediation; Insurance broker; Brokerage commission; Agency theory; Information asymmetry; Conflict of interest
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/16796

Examining the prevalence of transparency in the sale of auto insurance in Brazil and around the world, this study considers the costs and benefits of this transparency through two surveys and based on extensive contextual and scholarly analyses. The agency relationship in the insurance intermediation consists of two principals (the consumer and the insurer) and one agent (the insurance broker). This relationship presents a classic principal-agent dilemma where the broker’s compensation system — in which insurers pay the brokerage commission — may portend negative effects for consumers. The international survey queried insurance supervisors and organizations representing insurers and insurance brokers about global practices related to the transparency in the auto insurance sale and received responses from 39 foreign jurisdictions (in addition to the European Commission). In the national survey, 191 Brazilian insurance brokers answered a questionnaire on their practices and opinions related to transparency in the auto insurance sale. The results show that 24 out of the 39 international jurisdictions analyzed require or encourage the disclosure of brokerage commissions to consumers. In jurisdictions where disclosure is compulsory, there is prior (prior to the decision made by the consumer) and active (without being requested by the consumer) transparency. In the national survey, results showed that 92% of insurance brokers (legal entities) in Brazil do not disclose to consumers the amount of brokerage commission received, and that 93% of brokers are against active disclosure and 92% against passive disclosure (at consumer request). Given these results, and based on the theoretical and empirical evidence examined, this study recommends the adoption of transparency requirements relating to prior and active disclosure of brokerage commissions in Brazil.