Governança corporativa no Brasil: análise do custo de capital próprio em um ambiente com assimetria de informação

• Ano de defesa: 2012
• Autor(a) principal: Lombardi Junior, Guilherme
• Orientador(a): Ferraz, Lucas Pedreira do Couto
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Palavras-chave em Português: Governança corporativa; Assimetria de informação; Risco moral; Corporate governance; Information asymmetry
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Signaling; IPO; Moral hazard
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/9973

The stock exchange called BM&FBOVESPA created special stock listing segments in December of year 2000, which impose stricter rules than the legal framework, regarding the disclosure of financial information and the improvement of corporate ownership structure. The purpose of BM&FBOVESPA was to reduce the information asymmetry and, therefore, reduce the company’s cost of capital (equity). We sought to verify for the Brazilian stock market if there are statistically relevant differences in the cost of capital (equity), differentiating companies based on the levels of corporate governance while controlling the migration effect. We could confirm in this paper that the migration to the special stock listing segments yields better and statistically significant returns to the shareholders. However, we got some negative and statistically significant results for the stocks returns for companies listed in the special stock listing segments, when compared to the Basic Market. This result contradicts the initial intuition that good corporate governance reduces the cost of capital (equity) for the firm.