Inflation when the planner wants less spending

• Ano de defesa: 2014
• Autor(a) principal: Barros Junior, Fernando Antonio de
• Orientador(a): Cavalcanti, Ricardo de Oliveira
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: eng
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Monetary theory; Mechanism design; Inflation; Heterogeneous agents
• Link de acesso: https://hdl.handle.net/10438/11600

I study optima in a random-matching model of outside money. The examples in this paper show a conflict between private and collective interests. While the planner worry about the extensive and intensive margin effects of trades in a steady state, people want the exhaust the gains from trades immediately, i.e., once in a meeting, consumers prefer spend more for a better output than take the risk of saving money and wait for good meetings in the future. Thus, the conflict can force the planner to choose allocations with a more disperse money distribution, mainly if people are im- patient. When the patient rate is low enough, the planner uses a expansionary policy to generate a better distribution of money for future trades.