A litigância judicial habitual do Estado de Minas Gerais em face de seus agentes públicos, por controvérsias decorrentes de remuneração: estudo do fenômeno e suas causas

• Ano de defesa: 2020
• Autor(a) principal: Couto, Matheus Fernandes Figueiredo
• Orientador(a): Costa, Bruno Lazzarotti Diniz
• Banca de defesa: Costa, Bruno Lazzarotti Diniz, Carneiro, Ricardo, Franco, Marcelo Veiga
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Fundação João Pinheiro
• Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Mestrado em Administração Pública
• Departamento: Escola de Governo Professor Paulo Neves de Carvalho
• País: Brasil
• Palavras-chave em Português: Remuneração; Poder Judiciário; Burocracia
• Área do conhecimento CNPq: ADMINISTRACAO::ADMINISTRACAO PUBLICA
• Link de acesso: http://repositorio.fjp.mg.gov.br/handle/tede/479

The excessive judicialization of life in the current Brazilian society leads us to observe a crisis in the judiciary, in which too many demands are submitted to its scrutiny, and unsatisfactory results returned to society. This is a multicausal phenomenon, and the existence of players (litigants) habitual in the justice system, understood as individuals who obtain comparative advantages in the use of the judiciary in repetitive and serial form, one of its faces. In this context, it is observed that Brazilian public organizations are invariably the largest litigants in the national jurisdiction. In another turn, it should also be noted that national public organizations are essentially bureaucratic and, as such, subject to the typical dysfunctions of their structural model, among which stand out the aversion to change. The aversion to reform can be especially understood from the complexity of the decision-making process within bureaucratic organizations, which, on many occasions, evades rationality, presenting itself as a "garbage can". What was proposed in this paper was the observation of a specific theme with great repercussion in number of lawsuits involving the Executive Power of the State of Minas Gerais, namely; the judicial conflict between State (Executive) and its public agents for remuneration issues. Therefore, this excessive litigation was considered a problem in order to analyze whether the public behaves as a habitual litigant (or repeat player) in the face of its public agents, in the dispute for remuneration, as well as explanations (rational or not) for this behavior. Thus, the following hypothesis was tested: The State of Minas Gerais behaves like a habitual litigant (or repeat player) in the judicial conflict in front of its agents for remuneration, deliberately sending the disputes to the Judiciary, when it could revolve or prevent them by administrative means. This behavior is not only explained by the advantages that a repeat player hypothetically has in the serial judicialization of conflicts, but is influenced, in particular, by the high complexity of the decision making process in the bureaucratic organization, fact that imposes immobility due to resistance to the organizational changes necessary for the selfcomposed or preventive management of these disputes.