O bem e o self: um estudo sobre a ontologia temporalizada da moral de Charles Taylor a partir do problema da motivação

• Ano de defesa: 2008
• Autor(a) principal: Pereira, Taís Silva
• Orientador(a): Araújo, Luiz Bernardo Leite
• Banca de defesa: Chediak, Karla de Almeida , Dias, Maria Clara Marques
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro
• Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
• Departamento: Centro de Ciências Sociais::Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
• País: BR
• Palavras-chave em Português: Taylor, Charles, 1931-; Self (Filosofia); Ontologia; Bem; Self; Motivação; Conflito; Ontologia temporalizada da moral
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Good; Self; Motivation; Conflict; Temporalized ontology of moral
• Área do conhecimento CNPq: CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/handle/1/12202

The present master dissertation starts with the defense of moral motivation as a philosophical matter despite the impasses that it suscitates with the question what makes us be, act and think in a determined way and not in another? in view of contemporary discussions in moral and political philosophy. If in one hand the debates about multiculturalism, Human Rights, nationalism, and even in our own everyday conduct, open us to diversity of motives and ways of life linked to them. On the other hand, such problem looses strength in our investigations more and more. In fact, Charles Taylor s theory not only seems appropriate to the motivation s topic but also he has a different approach. Such approach and what will be defended along this work, consists in the temporalized ontology of moral which is marked by the conflict in the articulation of goods. This means that the motivations must involve ontological considerations about the man, the world, and through the relationship between the good and the self. A relationship that goes beyond a subject and/or community that has specific values, considers, however, the good as an indispensable concept for a self which shares with other selves a moral reality. This self is a strong evaluator because in his thoughts, actions and decisions he is always ranking goods, which are not arbitrary. They constitute, however, a public background in articulation with moral concepts. In this dissertation there is a defense for the differentiation between the notion of good such as Taylor understands it in his papers and what is generally understood as a (subjective) value in the discussion of the contemporary ethics and politics, enabling a new way of interpreting Taylor s moral realism beyond the dichotomy justice x good .