CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria
| Ano de defesa: | 2020 |
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| Autor(a) principal: | |
| Orientador(a): | |
| Banca de defesa: | |
| Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
| Tipo de acesso: | Acesso aberto |
| Idioma: | por |
| Instituição de defesa: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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| Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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| Departamento: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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| País: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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| Palavras-chave em Português: | |
| Link de acesso: | http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/53175 |
Resumo: | Studies claim that executives with narcissistic personalities have a strong influence on how companies can induce unethical behavior, thus reflecting on risks and fraud (APOSTOLOU et al., 2013; COHEN; KRISHNAMOORTHY; WRIGHT, 2002), manipulation of information in financial-accounting reports and internal controls (AMERNIC; CRAIG, 2010; ANDERSON; TIRRELL, 2004). Considering that the audit has the responsibility to assure users that the accounting and financial information declared by the companies is true (HASSAN; NASER, 2013), imparting credibility and confidence to the market, when providing services to companies with narcissistic CEOs, auditors need to increase the scope of work and the level of scrutiny, in order to reduce the overall audit risk to an acceptable level (APOSTOLOU; et al., 2013; BEAULIEU, 2001; CHEN; GUL; TSUI, 2003; KIZIRIAN; MAYHEW; SNEATHEN, 2005), thus being able to generate an increase in their fees. So, it is believed that narcissistic CEOs influence the determination of audit fees, and that, due to the narcissistic traits of the executives, aspects such as internal control, customer risk and their complexity, can also increase these fees. In the light of the assumptions of the theory of high scheduling, an end of scope or study objective - to analyze a relationship between a narcissistic personality of CEOs and auditors' fees -, to carry out a descriptive research, with a quantitative approach, from a data collection in a sample of 181 companies listed in Brazil, Bolsa, Balcão - B3 SA, with Conde Law system, with no period from 2015 to 2018. For data treatment, the difference test between mean (T Student), multiple regression and mediation analysis was used, the Breusch-Godfrey, Breusch-Pagan, Variance inflation factor test (vif test) was applied and Shapiro-Wilk, to confirm or refute the relationship between narcissistic CEOs and audit fees. The results show that narcissistic CEOs positively influence audit fees. As for the mediation analysis, it was found that there is an influence of narcissistic CEOs on internal controls (audit committee), thus reflecting on audit fees. Thus, it is inferred that the factors internal control (material weakness and significant deficiency), client risk and complexity are not mediating variables. Thus, the hypothesis that narcissistic CEOs influence auditor fees is confirmed and the hypotheses regarding material weakness and significant deficiencies (internal control), client risk and complexity as mediating variables are refuted. |
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Lima, Jane Elly Nunes da CostaDe Luca, Márcia Martins Mendes2020-07-29T10:48:21Z2020-07-29T10:48:21Z2020-04-24LIMA, Jane Elly Nunes da Costa. CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria. 2020. 90 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Administração e Controladoria) - Universidade Federal do Ceará, Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Atuária e Contabilidade, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração e Controladoria, Fortaleza-CE, 2020.http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/53175Studies claim that executives with narcissistic personalities have a strong influence on how companies can induce unethical behavior, thus reflecting on risks and fraud (APOSTOLOU et al., 2013; COHEN; KRISHNAMOORTHY; WRIGHT, 2002), manipulation of information in financial-accounting reports and internal controls (AMERNIC; CRAIG, 2010; ANDERSON; TIRRELL, 2004). Considering that the audit has the responsibility to assure users that the accounting and financial information declared by the companies is true (HASSAN; NASER, 2013), imparting credibility and confidence to the market, when providing services to companies with narcissistic CEOs, auditors need to increase the scope of work and the level of scrutiny, in order to reduce the overall audit risk to an acceptable level (APOSTOLOU; et al., 2013; BEAULIEU, 2001; CHEN; GUL; TSUI, 2003; KIZIRIAN; MAYHEW; SNEATHEN, 2005), thus being able to generate an increase in their fees. So, it is believed that narcissistic CEOs influence the determination of audit fees, and that, due to the narcissistic traits of the executives, aspects such as internal control, customer risk and their complexity, can also increase these fees. In the light of the assumptions of the theory of high scheduling, an end of scope or study objective - to analyze a relationship between a narcissistic personality of CEOs and auditors' fees -, to carry out a descriptive research, with a quantitative approach, from a data collection in a sample of 181 companies listed in Brazil, Bolsa, Balcão - B3 SA, with Conde Law system, with no period from 2015 to 2018. For data treatment, the difference test between mean (T Student), multiple regression and mediation analysis was used, the Breusch-Godfrey, Breusch-Pagan, Variance inflation factor test (vif test) was applied and Shapiro-Wilk, to confirm or refute the relationship between narcissistic CEOs and audit fees. The results show that narcissistic CEOs positively influence audit fees. As for the mediation analysis, it was found that there is an influence of narcissistic CEOs on internal controls (audit committee), thus reflecting on audit fees. Thus, it is inferred that the factors internal control (material weakness and significant deficiency), client risk and complexity are not mediating variables. Thus, the hypothesis that narcissistic CEOs influence auditor fees is confirmed and the hypotheses regarding material weakness and significant deficiencies (internal control), client risk and complexity as mediating variables are refuted.Estudos afirmam que os executivos com personalidades narcisistas têm uma forte influência sobre as empresas podendo induzir a um comportamento antiético, refletindo, assim, em riscos e fraudes (APOSTOLOU et al., 2013; COHEN; KRISHNAMOORTHY; WRIGHT, 2002), manipulações de informações nos relatórios financeiros-contábeis e nos controles internos (AMERNIC; CRAIG, 2010; ANDERSON; TIRRELL, 2004). Considerando que a auditoria tem a responsabilidade de assegurar aos usuários que as informações contábil-financeiras declaradas pelas empresas são verdadeiras (HASSAN; NASER, 2013), transmitindo credibilidade e confiança ao mercado, ao prestarem serviços às empresas com CEOs narcisistas, os auditores precisam aumentar o escopo do trabalho e o nível de escrutínio, visando reduzir o risco geral de auditoria a um nível aceitável (APOSTOLOU; et al., 2013; BEAULIEU, 2001; CHEN; GUL; TSUI, 2003; KIZIRIAN; MAYHEW; SNEATHEN, 2005), podendo, dessa forma, gerar um aumento dos seus honorários. Então, acredita-se que os CEOs narcisistas influenciam na determinação dos honorários de auditoria, e que, ainda, em decorrência dos traços narcisistas dos executivos, aspectos como o controle interno, risco do cliente, comitê de auditoria e sua complexidade, também podem aumentar esses honorários. À luz dos pressupostos da teoria do Alto Escalão, a fim de alcançar o objetivo do estudo – analisar a relação entre a personalidade narcisista dos CEOs e os honorários dos auditores –, realizou-se uma pesquisa descritiva, com abordagem quantitativa, a partir de uma coleta de dados em uma amostra de 181 empresas listadas na Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão - B3 S.A., com sistema Conde Law, no período de 2015 a 2018. Para o tratamento dos dados, utilizou-se o teste de diferença entre média (T Student), a regressão múltipla e a análise de mediação, aplicou-se os testes de Breusch-Godfrey, Breusch-Pagan, Variance inflation factor (teste vif) e Shapiro-Wilk, para confirmar ou refutar a relação entre os CEOs narcisistas e os honorários de auditoria. Os resultados mostram que os CEOs narcisistas influenciam positivamente os honorários de auditoria. Quanto à análise de mediação, verificou-se que existe influência dos CEOs narcisistas nos controles internos (comitê de auditoria), assim, refletindo nos honorários de auditoria. Dessa forma, infere-se que os fatores controle interno (fraqueza material e deficiência significativa), risco do cliente e complexidade não são variáveis mediadoras. Desse modo, se confirma a hipótese que os CEOs narcisistas influenciam os honorários de auditora e refuta-se as hipóteses quanto a fraqueza material e deficiências significativas (controle interno), o risco do cliente e a complexidade como variáveis mediadoras.Teoria do Alto escalãoGestoresPersonalidadeNarcisismoHonoráriosAuditoriaCEO narcisista e honorários de auditoriainfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisporreponame:Repositório Institucional da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)instacron:UFCinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-81978http://repositorio.ufc.br/bitstream/riufc/53175/2/license.txt4247602db8c5bb0eb5b2dc93ccdf9494MD52ORIGINAL2020_dis_jenclima.pdf2020_dis_jenclima.pdfapplication/pdf2001521http://repositorio.ufc.br/bitstream/riufc/53175/3/2020_dis_jenclima.pdfacfccdc77ed21ca61488f463720d3ea1MD53riufc/531752022-11-10 15:35:05.105oai:repositorio.ufc.br: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Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttp://www.repositorio.ufc.br/ri-oai/requestbu@ufc.br || repositorio@ufc.bropendoar:2022-11-10T18:35:05Repositório Institucional da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)false |
| dc.title.pt_BR.fl_str_mv |
CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria |
| title |
CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria |
| spellingShingle |
CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria Lima, Jane Elly Nunes da Costa Teoria do Alto escalão Gestores Personalidade Narcisismo Honorários Auditoria |
| title_short |
CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria |
| title_full |
CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria |
| title_fullStr |
CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria |
| title_full_unstemmed |
CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria |
| title_sort |
CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria |
| author |
Lima, Jane Elly Nunes da Costa |
| author_facet |
Lima, Jane Elly Nunes da Costa |
| author_role |
author |
| dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Lima, Jane Elly Nunes da Costa |
| dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv |
De Luca, Márcia Martins Mendes |
| contributor_str_mv |
De Luca, Márcia Martins Mendes |
| dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Teoria do Alto escalão Gestores Personalidade Narcisismo Honorários Auditoria |
| topic |
Teoria do Alto escalão Gestores Personalidade Narcisismo Honorários Auditoria |
| description |
Studies claim that executives with narcissistic personalities have a strong influence on how companies can induce unethical behavior, thus reflecting on risks and fraud (APOSTOLOU et al., 2013; COHEN; KRISHNAMOORTHY; WRIGHT, 2002), manipulation of information in financial-accounting reports and internal controls (AMERNIC; CRAIG, 2010; ANDERSON; TIRRELL, 2004). Considering that the audit has the responsibility to assure users that the accounting and financial information declared by the companies is true (HASSAN; NASER, 2013), imparting credibility and confidence to the market, when providing services to companies with narcissistic CEOs, auditors need to increase the scope of work and the level of scrutiny, in order to reduce the overall audit risk to an acceptable level (APOSTOLOU; et al., 2013; BEAULIEU, 2001; CHEN; GUL; TSUI, 2003; KIZIRIAN; MAYHEW; SNEATHEN, 2005), thus being able to generate an increase in their fees. So, it is believed that narcissistic CEOs influence the determination of audit fees, and that, due to the narcissistic traits of the executives, aspects such as internal control, customer risk and their complexity, can also increase these fees. In the light of the assumptions of the theory of high scheduling, an end of scope or study objective - to analyze a relationship between a narcissistic personality of CEOs and auditors' fees -, to carry out a descriptive research, with a quantitative approach, from a data collection in a sample of 181 companies listed in Brazil, Bolsa, Balcão - B3 SA, with Conde Law system, with no period from 2015 to 2018. For data treatment, the difference test between mean (T Student), multiple regression and mediation analysis was used, the Breusch-Godfrey, Breusch-Pagan, Variance inflation factor test (vif test) was applied and Shapiro-Wilk, to confirm or refute the relationship between narcissistic CEOs and audit fees. The results show that narcissistic CEOs positively influence audit fees. As for the mediation analysis, it was found that there is an influence of narcissistic CEOs on internal controls (audit committee), thus reflecting on audit fees. Thus, it is inferred that the factors internal control (material weakness and significant deficiency), client risk and complexity are not mediating variables. Thus, the hypothesis that narcissistic CEOs influence auditor fees is confirmed and the hypotheses regarding material weakness and significant deficiencies (internal control), client risk and complexity as mediating variables are refuted. |
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2020 |
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2020-07-29T10:48:21Z |
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2020-07-29T10:48:21Z |
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2020-04-24 |
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LIMA, Jane Elly Nunes da Costa. CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria. 2020. 90 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Administração e Controladoria) - Universidade Federal do Ceará, Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Atuária e Contabilidade, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração e Controladoria, Fortaleza-CE, 2020. |
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http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/53175 |
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LIMA, Jane Elly Nunes da Costa. CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria. 2020. 90 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Administração e Controladoria) - Universidade Federal do Ceará, Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Atuária e Contabilidade, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração e Controladoria, Fortaleza-CE, 2020. |
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