CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2020
Autor(a) principal: Lima, Jane Elly Nunes da Costa
Orientador(a): De Luca, Márcia Martins Mendes
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Não Informado pela instituição
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: Não Informado pela instituição
Palavras-chave em Português:
Link de acesso: http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/53175
Resumo: Studies claim that executives with narcissistic personalities have a strong influence on how companies can induce unethical behavior, thus reflecting on risks and fraud (APOSTOLOU et al., 2013; COHEN; KRISHNAMOORTHY; WRIGHT, 2002), manipulation of information in financial-accounting reports and internal controls (AMERNIC; CRAIG, 2010; ANDERSON; TIRRELL, 2004). Considering that the audit has the responsibility to assure users that the accounting and financial information declared by the companies is true (HASSAN; NASER, 2013), imparting credibility and confidence to the market, when providing services to companies with narcissistic CEOs, auditors need to increase the scope of work and the level of scrutiny, in order to reduce the overall audit risk to an acceptable level (APOSTOLOU; et al., 2013; BEAULIEU, 2001; CHEN; GUL; TSUI, 2003; KIZIRIAN; MAYHEW; SNEATHEN, 2005), thus being able to generate an increase in their fees. So, it is believed that narcissistic CEOs influence the determination of audit fees, and that, due to the narcissistic traits of the executives, aspects such as internal control, customer risk and their complexity, can also increase these fees. In the light of the assumptions of the theory of high scheduling, an end of scope or study objective - to analyze a relationship between a narcissistic personality of CEOs and auditors' fees -, to carry out a descriptive research, with a quantitative approach, from a data collection in a sample of 181 companies listed in Brazil, Bolsa, Balcão - B3 SA, with Conde Law system, with no period from 2015 to 2018. For data treatment, the difference test between mean (T Student), multiple regression and mediation analysis was used, the Breusch-Godfrey, Breusch-Pagan, Variance inflation factor test (vif test) was applied and Shapiro-Wilk, to confirm or refute the relationship between narcissistic CEOs and audit fees. The results show that narcissistic CEOs positively influence audit fees. As for the mediation analysis, it was found that there is an influence of narcissistic CEOs on internal controls (audit committee), thus reflecting on audit fees. Thus, it is inferred that the factors internal control (material weakness and significant deficiency), client risk and complexity are not mediating variables. Thus, the hypothesis that narcissistic CEOs influence auditor fees is confirmed and the hypotheses regarding material weakness and significant deficiencies (internal control), client risk and complexity as mediating variables are refuted.
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spelling Lima, Jane Elly Nunes da CostaDe Luca, Márcia Martins Mendes2020-07-29T10:48:21Z2020-07-29T10:48:21Z2020-04-24LIMA, Jane Elly Nunes da Costa. CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria. 2020. 90 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Administração e Controladoria) - Universidade Federal do Ceará, Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Atuária e Contabilidade, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração e Controladoria, Fortaleza-CE, 2020.http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/53175Studies claim that executives with narcissistic personalities have a strong influence on how companies can induce unethical behavior, thus reflecting on risks and fraud (APOSTOLOU et al., 2013; COHEN; KRISHNAMOORTHY; WRIGHT, 2002), manipulation of information in financial-accounting reports and internal controls (AMERNIC; CRAIG, 2010; ANDERSON; TIRRELL, 2004). Considering that the audit has the responsibility to assure users that the accounting and financial information declared by the companies is true (HASSAN; NASER, 2013), imparting credibility and confidence to the market, when providing services to companies with narcissistic CEOs, auditors need to increase the scope of work and the level of scrutiny, in order to reduce the overall audit risk to an acceptable level (APOSTOLOU; et al., 2013; BEAULIEU, 2001; CHEN; GUL; TSUI, 2003; KIZIRIAN; MAYHEW; SNEATHEN, 2005), thus being able to generate an increase in their fees. So, it is believed that narcissistic CEOs influence the determination of audit fees, and that, due to the narcissistic traits of the executives, aspects such as internal control, customer risk and their complexity, can also increase these fees. In the light of the assumptions of the theory of high scheduling, an end of scope or study objective - to analyze a relationship between a narcissistic personality of CEOs and auditors' fees -, to carry out a descriptive research, with a quantitative approach, from a data collection in a sample of 181 companies listed in Brazil, Bolsa, Balcão - B3 SA, with Conde Law system, with no period from 2015 to 2018. For data treatment, the difference test between mean (T Student), multiple regression and mediation analysis was used, the Breusch-Godfrey, Breusch-Pagan, Variance inflation factor test (vif test) was applied and Shapiro-Wilk, to confirm or refute the relationship between narcissistic CEOs and audit fees. The results show that narcissistic CEOs positively influence audit fees. As for the mediation analysis, it was found that there is an influence of narcissistic CEOs on internal controls (audit committee), thus reflecting on audit fees. Thus, it is inferred that the factors internal control (material weakness and significant deficiency), client risk and complexity are not mediating variables. Thus, the hypothesis that narcissistic CEOs influence auditor fees is confirmed and the hypotheses regarding material weakness and significant deficiencies (internal control), client risk and complexity as mediating variables are refuted.Estudos afirmam que os executivos com personalidades narcisistas têm uma forte influência sobre as empresas podendo induzir a um comportamento antiético, refletindo, assim, em riscos e fraudes (APOSTOLOU et al., 2013; COHEN; KRISHNAMOORTHY; WRIGHT, 2002), manipulações de informações nos relatórios financeiros-contábeis e nos controles internos (AMERNIC; CRAIG, 2010; ANDERSON; TIRRELL, 2004). Considerando que a auditoria tem a responsabilidade de assegurar aos usuários que as informações contábil-financeiras declaradas pelas empresas são verdadeiras (HASSAN; NASER, 2013), transmitindo credibilidade e confiança ao mercado, ao prestarem serviços às empresas com CEOs narcisistas, os auditores precisam aumentar o escopo do trabalho e o nível de escrutínio, visando reduzir o risco geral de auditoria a um nível aceitável (APOSTOLOU; et al., 2013; BEAULIEU, 2001; CHEN; GUL; TSUI, 2003; KIZIRIAN; MAYHEW; SNEATHEN, 2005), podendo, dessa forma, gerar um aumento dos seus honorários. Então, acredita-se que os CEOs narcisistas influenciam na determinação dos honorários de auditoria, e que, ainda, em decorrência dos traços narcisistas dos executivos, aspectos como o controle interno, risco do cliente, comitê de auditoria e sua complexidade, também podem aumentar esses honorários. À luz dos pressupostos da teoria do Alto Escalão, a fim de alcançar o objetivo do estudo – analisar a relação entre a personalidade narcisista dos CEOs e os honorários dos auditores –, realizou-se uma pesquisa descritiva, com abordagem quantitativa, a partir de uma coleta de dados em uma amostra de 181 empresas listadas na Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão - B3 S.A., com sistema Conde Law, no período de 2015 a 2018. Para o tratamento dos dados, utilizou-se o teste de diferença entre média (T Student), a regressão múltipla e a análise de mediação, aplicou-se os testes de Breusch-Godfrey, Breusch-Pagan, Variance inflation factor (teste vif) e Shapiro-Wilk, para confirmar ou refutar a relação entre os CEOs narcisistas e os honorários de auditoria. Os resultados mostram que os CEOs narcisistas influenciam positivamente os honorários de auditoria. Quanto à análise de mediação, verificou-se que existe influência dos CEOs narcisistas nos controles internos (comitê de auditoria), assim, refletindo nos honorários de auditoria. Dessa forma, infere-se que os fatores controle interno (fraqueza material e deficiência significativa), risco do cliente e complexidade não são variáveis mediadoras. Desse modo, se confirma a hipótese que os CEOs narcisistas influenciam os honorários de auditora e refuta-se as hipóteses quanto a fraqueza material e deficiências significativas (controle interno), o risco do cliente e a complexidade como variáveis mediadoras.Teoria do Alto escalãoGestoresPersonalidadeNarcisismoHonoráriosAuditoriaCEO narcisista e honorários de auditoriainfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisporreponame:Repositório Institucional da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)instacron:UFCinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-81978http://repositorio.ufc.br/bitstream/riufc/53175/2/license.txt4247602db8c5bb0eb5b2dc93ccdf9494MD52ORIGINAL2020_dis_jenclima.pdf2020_dis_jenclima.pdfapplication/pdf2001521http://repositorio.ufc.br/bitstream/riufc/53175/3/2020_dis_jenclima.pdfacfccdc77ed21ca61488f463720d3ea1MD53riufc/531752022-11-10 15:35:05.105oai:repositorio.ufc.br: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Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttp://www.repositorio.ufc.br/ri-oai/requestbu@ufc.br || repositorio@ufc.bropendoar:2022-11-10T18:35:05Repositório Institucional da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)false
dc.title.pt_BR.fl_str_mv CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria
title CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria
spellingShingle CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria
Lima, Jane Elly Nunes da Costa
Teoria do Alto escalão
Gestores
Personalidade
Narcisismo
Honorários
Auditoria
title_short CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria
title_full CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria
title_fullStr CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria
title_full_unstemmed CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria
title_sort CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria
author Lima, Jane Elly Nunes da Costa
author_facet Lima, Jane Elly Nunes da Costa
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Lima, Jane Elly Nunes da Costa
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv De Luca, Márcia Martins Mendes
contributor_str_mv De Luca, Márcia Martins Mendes
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Teoria do Alto escalão
Gestores
Personalidade
Narcisismo
Honorários
Auditoria
topic Teoria do Alto escalão
Gestores
Personalidade
Narcisismo
Honorários
Auditoria
description Studies claim that executives with narcissistic personalities have a strong influence on how companies can induce unethical behavior, thus reflecting on risks and fraud (APOSTOLOU et al., 2013; COHEN; KRISHNAMOORTHY; WRIGHT, 2002), manipulation of information in financial-accounting reports and internal controls (AMERNIC; CRAIG, 2010; ANDERSON; TIRRELL, 2004). Considering that the audit has the responsibility to assure users that the accounting and financial information declared by the companies is true (HASSAN; NASER, 2013), imparting credibility and confidence to the market, when providing services to companies with narcissistic CEOs, auditors need to increase the scope of work and the level of scrutiny, in order to reduce the overall audit risk to an acceptable level (APOSTOLOU; et al., 2013; BEAULIEU, 2001; CHEN; GUL; TSUI, 2003; KIZIRIAN; MAYHEW; SNEATHEN, 2005), thus being able to generate an increase in their fees. So, it is believed that narcissistic CEOs influence the determination of audit fees, and that, due to the narcissistic traits of the executives, aspects such as internal control, customer risk and their complexity, can also increase these fees. In the light of the assumptions of the theory of high scheduling, an end of scope or study objective - to analyze a relationship between a narcissistic personality of CEOs and auditors' fees -, to carry out a descriptive research, with a quantitative approach, from a data collection in a sample of 181 companies listed in Brazil, Bolsa, Balcão - B3 SA, with Conde Law system, with no period from 2015 to 2018. For data treatment, the difference test between mean (T Student), multiple regression and mediation analysis was used, the Breusch-Godfrey, Breusch-Pagan, Variance inflation factor test (vif test) was applied and Shapiro-Wilk, to confirm or refute the relationship between narcissistic CEOs and audit fees. The results show that narcissistic CEOs positively influence audit fees. As for the mediation analysis, it was found that there is an influence of narcissistic CEOs on internal controls (audit committee), thus reflecting on audit fees. Thus, it is inferred that the factors internal control (material weakness and significant deficiency), client risk and complexity are not mediating variables. Thus, the hypothesis that narcissistic CEOs influence auditor fees is confirmed and the hypotheses regarding material weakness and significant deficiencies (internal control), client risk and complexity as mediating variables are refuted.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2020-07-29T10:48:21Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2020-07-29T10:48:21Z
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2020-04-24
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dc.identifier.citation.fl_str_mv LIMA, Jane Elly Nunes da Costa. CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria. 2020. 90 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Administração e Controladoria) - Universidade Federal do Ceará, Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Atuária e Contabilidade, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração e Controladoria, Fortaleza-CE, 2020.
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/53175
identifier_str_mv LIMA, Jane Elly Nunes da Costa. CEO narcisista e honorários de auditoria. 2020. 90 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Administração e Controladoria) - Universidade Federal do Ceará, Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Atuária e Contabilidade, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração e Controladoria, Fortaleza-CE, 2020.
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