Um esboço do ceticismo metafilosófico contemporâneo

• Ano de defesa: 2025
• Autor(a) principal: Gonçalves, Conrado Vasconcelos
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo; BR; Mestrado em Filosofia; Centro de Ciências Humanas e Naturais; UFES; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
• Palavras-chave em Português: Metafilosofia; Epistemologia da filosofia; Ceticismo metafilosófico; Antifilosofia; Filosofia terapêutica; Metaphilosophy; Epistemology of philosophy; Metaphilosophical skepticism; Antiphilosophy; Therapeutic philosophy; Filosofia
• Link de acesso: http://repositorio.ufes.br/handle/10/18689

The present research investigates the thesis of metaphilosophical skepticism as it has been presented and discussed recently, along with the arguments in its favor, the reactions to the implications of such form of skepticism to the practice of philosophy, traditionally conceived of as the search for ideal epistemic states, and the prospects of living while identifying as a skeptic about philosophy. First, it analyzes the components of the traditional conception of philosophy as epistemic philosophy, as well as the concept and forms of skepticism, in order to determine in which sense the thesis of metaphilosophical skepticism is a form of skepticism about philosophy, concluding that it is the thesis according to which (i) philosophers do not possess a relevant ideal epistemic state about the philosophical theses they advance; (ii) philosophers should therefore suspend belief or reduce high confidence about these theses. Following this, it presents the arguments in favor of the metaphilosophical skeptical thesis that philosophers do not possess rational belief about the theses they advance and should therefore suspend belief or reduce high confidence about these theses, giving special focus to the epistemological arguments that appeal to the notion of epistemic defeaters. Following this, it presents the arguments for the implication that metaphilosophical skepticism leads not only to the irrationality of the practice of philosophy, but also to what has been called “the sincere philosopher’s dilemma”: either the philosopher must abandon the sincerity of his believing his own philosophical views in order to be rational, or he must abandon his rationality in order to sincerely advance the philosophical views he believes. Different responses to the dilemma are presented and assessed. After concluding that they are insufficient, it presents three problems to those who wish to identify themselves as metaphilosophical skeptics: the problem of self-refutation, the problem of the entanglement between the philosophical and the non-philosophical, and the problem of apraxia. It outlines in response to these problems a model of a consistent metaphilosophical skeptic inspired by the model of the skeptic proposed by some neopyrrhonians. Finally, it discusses the question whether the consistent metaphilosophical skeptic is at bottom a neopyrrhonian, and concludes that, on the contrary, pyrrhonism and neopyrrhonism are particular manifestations of metaphilosophical skepticism as an attitude