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Gastos públicos e as relações de poder financeiro na Federação brasileira: inconstitucionalidade dos projetos federais custeados com os orçamentos subnacionais

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2021
Autor(a) principal: Reinaldo Belli de Souza Alves Costa
Orientador(a): Não Informado pela instituição
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Não Informado pela instituição
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: Não Informado pela instituição
Palavras-chave em Português:
Link de acesso: https://hdl.handle.net/1843/36521
Resumo: This work focuses on public expenditure of administrative execution by States, Federal District and Municipalities, determined by normative acts issued by the Brazilian National Congress. It begins by laying out theoretical foundations about Brazilian financial federalism, the system of division of financial power vertically and horizontally considered, to reveal the existence of a transversal power relationship between the Federal Legislative Power and subcentral Governments, with specific characteristics. It presents a proposal for a logical structure of the public expenditure norm of administrative execution, and presents the legislative competence of the Federal Union in matters of Financial Law and public spending. Then, a case study is carried out, with examples of federal regulations (policy-decision making) that constrain the subcentral Governments’ budget, in matter of public expenditure (policy-making). It is concluded, among other aspects, that the federal Legislative Power edits repeatedly normatively imbalanced acts in the regulation of federative reciprocal obligations, in violation of the cooperative dimension of the Brazilian federalism, constitutional principle. Three alternatives are exposed to solve this structural unconstitutionality of the federal acts: two of them of a legal nature, the first of jurisdictional competence and the second of legislative competence, and the third of a political nature, which would also require a constitutional reform. Finally, a main conclusion is exposed.
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spelling 2021-06-19T00:09:56Z2025-09-09T00:48:48Z2021-06-19T00:09:56Z2021-03-30https://hdl.handle.net/1843/36521This work focuses on public expenditure of administrative execution by States, Federal District and Municipalities, determined by normative acts issued by the Brazilian National Congress. It begins by laying out theoretical foundations about Brazilian financial federalism, the system of division of financial power vertically and horizontally considered, to reveal the existence of a transversal power relationship between the Federal Legislative Power and subcentral Governments, with specific characteristics. It presents a proposal for a logical structure of the public expenditure norm of administrative execution, and presents the legislative competence of the Federal Union in matters of Financial Law and public spending. Then, a case study is carried out, with examples of federal regulations (policy-decision making) that constrain the subcentral Governments’ budget, in matter of public expenditure (policy-making). It is concluded, among other aspects, that the federal Legislative Power edits repeatedly normatively imbalanced acts in the regulation of federative reciprocal obligations, in violation of the cooperative dimension of the Brazilian federalism, constitutional principle. Three alternatives are exposed to solve this structural unconstitutionality of the federal acts: two of them of a legal nature, the first of jurisdictional competence and the second of legislative competence, and the third of a political nature, which would also require a constitutional reform. Finally, a main conclusion is exposed.porUniversidade Federal de Minas Geraishttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pt/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessDireito financeiroFederalismoGastos públicosOrçamentoDesequilíbrio normativoDireito financeiro – BrasilFederalismoDespesa pública – Política governamental – BrasilOrçamentoGastos públicos e as relações de poder financeiro na Federação brasileira: inconstitucionalidade dos projetos federais custeados com os orçamentos subnacionaisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisReinaldo Belli de Souza Alves Costareponame:Repositório Institucional da UFMGinstname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)instacron:UFMGhttp://lattes.cnpq.br/9576798628439838André Mendes Moreirahttp://lattes.cnpq.br/2162607115118731Misabel de Abreu Machado DerziOnofre Alves Batista JúniorFernando Facury ScaffEste trabalho cuida dos gastos públicos de execução administrativa por parte de Estados, Distrito Federal e Municípios, determinados por atos normativos expedidos pelo Congresso Nacional. Inicia por traçar alicerces teóricos sobre o federalismo financeiro brasileiro, o sistema de desconcentração do poder financeiro vertical e horizontalmente considerado, para revelar a existência de uma relação transversal de poder, entre Legislativo Federal e Executivos Subnacionais, com características específicas. Apresenta uma proposta de estrutura lógica da norma prescritiva de gastos públicos de execução administrativa, e delimita o espectro de competência da União Federal em matéria de Direito Financeiro e gastos públicos. Na sequência, é realizado um estudo de casos, com doze exemplos de normatizações federais mais e menos densas do regime de gastos públicos de execução subnacional. Conclui-se, entre outros aspectos, que o legislador financeiro federal apresenta conduta reiterada de positivar atos que padecem de desequilíbrio normativo na regulação das obrigações recíprocas, em violação à dimensão cooperativa do federalismo financeiro previsto na Constituição da República de 1988. Na última parte do trabalho, expõem-se três alternativas à reversão de um quadro estrutural de inconstitucionalidade por violação ao princípio federativo, duas delas de cunho jurídico (judicial e legislativo) e a terceira de natureza política. Por fim, são expostas as conclusões.BrasilDIREITO - FACULDADE DE DIREITOPrograma de Pós-Graduação em DireitoUFMGORIGINALDISSERTAÇÃO DE MESTRADO REINALDO BELLI - 01.06.2021.pdfapplication/pdf2087401https://repositorio.ufmg.br//bitstreams/a0d34ad8-618d-4cab-9cd4-3c319ec56bab/downloadd12a3bc15a013b0dcd37ec62282589dcMD51trueAnonymousREADCC-LICENSElicense_rdfapplication/octet-stream811https://repositorio.ufmg.br//bitstreams/b83499a9-94d5-48de-b7bb-9dd4030c08d3/downloadcfd6801dba008cb6adbd9838b81582abMD52falseAnonymousREADLICENSElicense.txttext/plain2119https://repositorio.ufmg.br//bitstreams/9fcfca34-aa15-424c-b689-4e34caab27fb/download34badce4be7e31e3adb4575ae96af679MD53falseAnonymousREAD1843/365212025-09-08 21:48:48.498http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pt/Acesso Abertoopen.accessoai:repositorio.ufmg.br:1843/36521https://repositorio.ufmg.br/Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttps://repositorio.ufmg.br/oairepositorio@ufmg.bropendoar:2025-09-09T00:48:48Repositório Institucional da UFMG - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)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
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Gastos públicos e as relações de poder financeiro na Federação brasileira: inconstitucionalidade dos projetos federais custeados com os orçamentos subnacionais
title Gastos públicos e as relações de poder financeiro na Federação brasileira: inconstitucionalidade dos projetos federais custeados com os orçamentos subnacionais
spellingShingle Gastos públicos e as relações de poder financeiro na Federação brasileira: inconstitucionalidade dos projetos federais custeados com os orçamentos subnacionais
Reinaldo Belli de Souza Alves Costa
Direito financeiro – Brasil
Federalismo
Despesa pública – Política governamental – Brasil
Orçamento
Direito financeiro
Federalismo
Gastos públicos
Orçamento
Desequilíbrio normativo
title_short Gastos públicos e as relações de poder financeiro na Federação brasileira: inconstitucionalidade dos projetos federais custeados com os orçamentos subnacionais
title_full Gastos públicos e as relações de poder financeiro na Federação brasileira: inconstitucionalidade dos projetos federais custeados com os orçamentos subnacionais
title_fullStr Gastos públicos e as relações de poder financeiro na Federação brasileira: inconstitucionalidade dos projetos federais custeados com os orçamentos subnacionais
title_full_unstemmed Gastos públicos e as relações de poder financeiro na Federação brasileira: inconstitucionalidade dos projetos federais custeados com os orçamentos subnacionais
title_sort Gastos públicos e as relações de poder financeiro na Federação brasileira: inconstitucionalidade dos projetos federais custeados com os orçamentos subnacionais
author Reinaldo Belli de Souza Alves Costa
author_facet Reinaldo Belli de Souza Alves Costa
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Reinaldo Belli de Souza Alves Costa
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Direito financeiro – Brasil
Federalismo
Despesa pública – Política governamental – Brasil
Orçamento
topic Direito financeiro – Brasil
Federalismo
Despesa pública – Política governamental – Brasil
Orçamento
Direito financeiro
Federalismo
Gastos públicos
Orçamento
Desequilíbrio normativo
dc.subject.other.none.fl_str_mv Direito financeiro
Federalismo
Gastos públicos
Orçamento
Desequilíbrio normativo
description This work focuses on public expenditure of administrative execution by States, Federal District and Municipalities, determined by normative acts issued by the Brazilian National Congress. It begins by laying out theoretical foundations about Brazilian financial federalism, the system of division of financial power vertically and horizontally considered, to reveal the existence of a transversal power relationship between the Federal Legislative Power and subcentral Governments, with specific characteristics. It presents a proposal for a logical structure of the public expenditure norm of administrative execution, and presents the legislative competence of the Federal Union in matters of Financial Law and public spending. Then, a case study is carried out, with examples of federal regulations (policy-decision making) that constrain the subcentral Governments’ budget, in matter of public expenditure (policy-making). It is concluded, among other aspects, that the federal Legislative Power edits repeatedly normatively imbalanced acts in the regulation of federative reciprocal obligations, in violation of the cooperative dimension of the Brazilian federalism, constitutional principle. Three alternatives are exposed to solve this structural unconstitutionality of the federal acts: two of them of a legal nature, the first of jurisdictional competence and the second of legislative competence, and the third of a political nature, which would also require a constitutional reform. Finally, a main conclusion is exposed.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2021-06-19T00:09:56Z
2025-09-09T00:48:48Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2021-06-19T00:09:56Z
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2021-03-30
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publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
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