A rede brasileira de instituições de accountability: um mapa do enfrentamento da corrupção na esfera local

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2015
Autor(a) principal: Ana Luiza Melo Aranha
Orientador(a): Não Informado pela instituição
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Tese
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Não Informado pela instituição
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: Não Informado pela instituição
Palavras-chave em Português:
Link de acesso: https://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUOS-A4RF5P
Resumo: The central purpose of this thesis is to map out the Brazilian web of accountability institutions how these institutions establish links with each other in order to control and sanction the cases of corruption that reach them. Particular focus is on the institutions that are at the centerof an anti-corruption agenda, including the Federal Public Prosecution, the Federal Police, the Office of the Comptroller General, the Federal Court of Accounts, the Federal Justice and the Ministries. In the literature, the most widespread argument is that despite recent institutionalimprovements, the final result of this web in terms of interaction and coordination is still weak. In order to check the present situation, the study tests these claims by looking at the program called Inspections of Public Lotteries, which targets the federal funds transferred to municipalities. Given that this program brings irregularities to the public sphere, we askwhether investigative or judicial proceedings are established in the other institutions that compose the web of accountability. We observe the flux of control activities among the institutions until they reach the Judiciary and become an action that aims at judicial sanction. This overview has the objective of telling two stories. The first describes if and how theseinstitutions interact as a result of the lottery program, following the trajectory of the irregularities over time from a longitudinal perspective. In addition, we analyze semistructured interviews with key actors of the institutions studied. In the second story, we explore possible causal mechanisms involved in both the moment prior to interactions (suchas factors impacting the establishment of such interactions) and in a later moment (such as how quickly or slowly the interactions affect the speed of the proceedings). In both stories, the predominant logic is the one of mixing methods, bringing together statistical and processtracingapproaches. We conclude that the web is able to coordinate and articulate itself in order to control and hold the public officials accountable, but not in a homogeneous way across all institutions. In the quantitative descriptive stage, we find numerous investigativeproceedings initiated by the Public Prosecution, some by the Ministries and a few by the Court of Accounts, with the latter being a little more active in fighting corruption. The investigation phases prevail over others, with a few cases arriving at the Judicial Courts, and the ones that do suffer from delayed proceedings. From a qualitative point of view, we showhow the interactions occur mainly between the Public Prosecution (MPF) and the Comptroller (CGU) and between the latter and the Federal Police (PF). The Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) is portrayed as a remote institution that prefers interactions with local institutions andfocuses on governance. Lastly, the causal inferences reveal that while corruption may be important in the institutions decisions to interact as indicated by the results from the logistic regressions corruption is not important enough to expedite the progress of the cases and, when it has a significant impact, it leads to slower processes as indicated by the results of the survival analysis. Furthermore, the interactions are fundamental to expedite the arrival of the processes at the final stage of accountability, but do not contribute to faster sentencing.The theoretical perspective emphasizes that in order to hold officials accountable for their actions, managing to make them responsible for the exclusions that they may cause (such as corruption actions), the web of accountability institutions fulfill an important role of reinforcing and empowering democracy and its basic inclusive condition.
id UFMG_a1cd1349e7f0bd6fa231e7def647f31b
oai_identifier_str oai:repositorio.ufmg.br:1843/BUOS-A4RF5P
network_acronym_str UFMG
network_name_str Repositório Institucional da UFMG
repository_id_str
spelling 2019-08-14T09:28:59Z2025-09-09T01:29:43Z2019-08-14T09:28:59Z2015-09-25https://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUOS-A4RF5PThe central purpose of this thesis is to map out the Brazilian web of accountability institutions how these institutions establish links with each other in order to control and sanction the cases of corruption that reach them. Particular focus is on the institutions that are at the centerof an anti-corruption agenda, including the Federal Public Prosecution, the Federal Police, the Office of the Comptroller General, the Federal Court of Accounts, the Federal Justice and the Ministries. In the literature, the most widespread argument is that despite recent institutionalimprovements, the final result of this web in terms of interaction and coordination is still weak. In order to check the present situation, the study tests these claims by looking at the program called Inspections of Public Lotteries, which targets the federal funds transferred to municipalities. Given that this program brings irregularities to the public sphere, we askwhether investigative or judicial proceedings are established in the other institutions that compose the web of accountability. We observe the flux of control activities among the institutions until they reach the Judiciary and become an action that aims at judicial sanction. This overview has the objective of telling two stories. The first describes if and how theseinstitutions interact as a result of the lottery program, following the trajectory of the irregularities over time from a longitudinal perspective. In addition, we analyze semistructured interviews with key actors of the institutions studied. In the second story, we explore possible causal mechanisms involved in both the moment prior to interactions (suchas factors impacting the establishment of such interactions) and in a later moment (such as how quickly or slowly the interactions affect the speed of the proceedings). In both stories, the predominant logic is the one of mixing methods, bringing together statistical and processtracingapproaches. We conclude that the web is able to coordinate and articulate itself in order to control and hold the public officials accountable, but not in a homogeneous way across all institutions. In the quantitative descriptive stage, we find numerous investigativeproceedings initiated by the Public Prosecution, some by the Ministries and a few by the Court of Accounts, with the latter being a little more active in fighting corruption. The investigation phases prevail over others, with a few cases arriving at the Judicial Courts, and the ones that do suffer from delayed proceedings. From a qualitative point of view, we showhow the interactions occur mainly between the Public Prosecution (MPF) and the Comptroller (CGU) and between the latter and the Federal Police (PF). The Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) is portrayed as a remote institution that prefers interactions with local institutions andfocuses on governance. Lastly, the causal inferences reveal that while corruption may be important in the institutions decisions to interact as indicated by the results from the logistic regressions corruption is not important enough to expedite the progress of the cases and, when it has a significant impact, it leads to slower processes as indicated by the results of the survival analysis. Furthermore, the interactions are fundamental to expedite the arrival of the processes at the final stage of accountability, but do not contribute to faster sentencing.The theoretical perspective emphasizes that in order to hold officials accountable for their actions, managing to make them responsible for the exclusions that they may cause (such as corruption actions), the web of accountability institutions fulfill an important role of reinforcing and empowering democracy and its basic inclusive condition.Universidade Federal de Minas GeraisBrasilInteraçõesDemocraciaRede de instituições deAccountabilityDescentralizaçãoCorrupçãoaccountabilityResponsabilidade (Direito)Corrupção na políticaBrasil lítica e governoCiência políticaA rede brasileira de instituições de accountability: um mapa do enfrentamento da corrupção na esfera localinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisAna Luiza Melo Aranhainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessporreponame:Repositório Institucional da UFMGinstname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)instacron:UFMGFernando de Barros FilgueirasJuarez Rocha GuimaraesRogério Bastos ArantesMarco Antonio Carvalho TeixeiraMatthew Macleod TaylorA proposta central desta tese é mapear o funcionamento da rede brasileira de instituições de accountability como as instituições se articulam para controlar e responsabilizar os casos de corrupçãoque chegam até elas com atenção especialmente voltada para as instituições que estariam no centro de uma agenda anticorrupção, englobando Ministério Público Federal, Polícia Federal, Controladoria Geral da União, Tribunal de Contas da União, Justiça Federal eMinistérios. Na literatura, o argumento mais disseminado é o de que, apesar do aprimoramento institucional recente, o resultado final dessa rede em termos de interações e de coordenação seria fraco. Para averiguar a situação atual deste resultado, submetemos asinterações a um teste: o Programa de Fiscalizações a Partir de Sorteios Públicos da CGU, no qual esta audita os recursos federais transferidos para os governos locais. Dado que este programa traz as irregularidades a público, será que são estabelecidos processos deinvestigação e de julgamento nas outras instituições que compõem a rede? Observa-se como as atividades de controle fluem entre as instituições até chegar ao Poder Judiciário e se tornar uma ação que vise à sanção. O mapeamento proposto objetiva contar duas histórias. Aprimeira descreve se e como essas instituições interagem a partir do programa de sorteios, acompanhando ao longo do tempo a trajetória das irregularidades em uma perspectiva longitudinal e, além disso, recorrendo a entrevistas semi-estruturadas com pessoas-chavedas instituições estudadas. Na segunda história são explorados os possíveis mecanismos causais envolvidos tanto no momento prévio das interações (como os fatores que impactam o estabelecimento das mesmas) quanto no momento posterior (como as interações afetam arapidez com que as irregularidades são processadas). Em ambas histórias, predomina a lógica da mistura de métodos, trazendo a estatística e o process-tracing de forma imbricada. Concluímos que a rede consegue se coordenar e articular para controlar e responsabilizar as irregularidades encontradas, mas não de uma forma homogênea entre todas as instituições. Pelas inferências descritivas quantitativas, encontramos inúmeros processos investigativos abertos pelo MPF, alguns pelos Ministérios e poucos pelo TCU, com este último um poucomais ativo em agir contra corrupção. A fase das investigações predomina, com poucos processos chegando à Justiça e esta apresenta um processamento lento. Do ponto de vista qualitativo, as interações ressaltadas se dão principalmente entre MPF e CGU e entre esta e a PF. O TCU é retratado enquanto uma instituição afastada, que se volta para as interações com instituições locais e promoção dagovernança. Por último, nas inferências causais, os testesapontam que a corrupção pode até ser importante na decisão de agir das instituições resultado das regressões logísticas mas não é tão importante a ponto de agilizar o andamento dos processos e, quando tem um impacto significativo, leva a processos mais lentos resultado da análise de sobrevivência. Ainda, as interações são fundamentais para agilizar a chegada dos processos na fase final da accountability, mas não contribuem para sentenciamentos mais rápidos. A perspectiva teórica reforça que, ao conseguir manter os governantes accountables pelas suas ações, conseguindo responsabilizá-los pelas exclusões que provocam (como a corrupção), as instituições da rede cumpririam um papel de reforço à democracia e sua condição inclusiva básica.UFMGORIGINALtese_completa_versaofinal.pdfapplication/pdf4072193https://repositorio.ufmg.br//bitstreams/7fd1203a-9e2d-476a-aa91-15586589f94e/downloaddefc844d26c9e83b7bbc11a73eccd035MD51trueAnonymousREADTEXTtese_completa_versaofinal.pdf.txttext/plain1304185https://repositorio.ufmg.br//bitstreams/f17802a2-21ec-4b0f-9e52-8e41fc52a6de/downloadc26d7f5dbc1ed9ea86dc9513d28ede4cMD52falseAnonymousREAD1843/BUOS-A4RF5P2025-09-08 22:29:43.542open.accessoai:repositorio.ufmg.br:1843/BUOS-A4RF5Phttps://repositorio.ufmg.br/Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttps://repositorio.ufmg.br/oairepositorio@ufmg.bropendoar:2025-09-09T01:29:43Repositório Institucional da UFMG - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A rede brasileira de instituições de accountability: um mapa do enfrentamento da corrupção na esfera local
title A rede brasileira de instituições de accountability: um mapa do enfrentamento da corrupção na esfera local
spellingShingle A rede brasileira de instituições de accountability: um mapa do enfrentamento da corrupção na esfera local
Ana Luiza Melo Aranha
Responsabilidade (Direito)
Corrupção na política
Brasil lítica e governo
Ciência política
Brasil
Interações
Democracia
Rede de instituições de
Accountability
Descentralização
Corrupção
accountability
title_short A rede brasileira de instituições de accountability: um mapa do enfrentamento da corrupção na esfera local
title_full A rede brasileira de instituições de accountability: um mapa do enfrentamento da corrupção na esfera local
title_fullStr A rede brasileira de instituições de accountability: um mapa do enfrentamento da corrupção na esfera local
title_full_unstemmed A rede brasileira de instituições de accountability: um mapa do enfrentamento da corrupção na esfera local
title_sort A rede brasileira de instituições de accountability: um mapa do enfrentamento da corrupção na esfera local
author Ana Luiza Melo Aranha
author_facet Ana Luiza Melo Aranha
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Ana Luiza Melo Aranha
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Responsabilidade (Direito)
Corrupção na política
Brasil lítica e governo
Ciência política
topic Responsabilidade (Direito)
Corrupção na política
Brasil lítica e governo
Ciência política
Brasil
Interações
Democracia
Rede de instituições de
Accountability
Descentralização
Corrupção
accountability
dc.subject.other.none.fl_str_mv Brasil
Interações
Democracia
Rede de instituições de
Accountability
Descentralização
Corrupção
accountability
description The central purpose of this thesis is to map out the Brazilian web of accountability institutions how these institutions establish links with each other in order to control and sanction the cases of corruption that reach them. Particular focus is on the institutions that are at the centerof an anti-corruption agenda, including the Federal Public Prosecution, the Federal Police, the Office of the Comptroller General, the Federal Court of Accounts, the Federal Justice and the Ministries. In the literature, the most widespread argument is that despite recent institutionalimprovements, the final result of this web in terms of interaction and coordination is still weak. In order to check the present situation, the study tests these claims by looking at the program called Inspections of Public Lotteries, which targets the federal funds transferred to municipalities. Given that this program brings irregularities to the public sphere, we askwhether investigative or judicial proceedings are established in the other institutions that compose the web of accountability. We observe the flux of control activities among the institutions until they reach the Judiciary and become an action that aims at judicial sanction. This overview has the objective of telling two stories. The first describes if and how theseinstitutions interact as a result of the lottery program, following the trajectory of the irregularities over time from a longitudinal perspective. In addition, we analyze semistructured interviews with key actors of the institutions studied. In the second story, we explore possible causal mechanisms involved in both the moment prior to interactions (suchas factors impacting the establishment of such interactions) and in a later moment (such as how quickly or slowly the interactions affect the speed of the proceedings). In both stories, the predominant logic is the one of mixing methods, bringing together statistical and processtracingapproaches. We conclude that the web is able to coordinate and articulate itself in order to control and hold the public officials accountable, but not in a homogeneous way across all institutions. In the quantitative descriptive stage, we find numerous investigativeproceedings initiated by the Public Prosecution, some by the Ministries and a few by the Court of Accounts, with the latter being a little more active in fighting corruption. The investigation phases prevail over others, with a few cases arriving at the Judicial Courts, and the ones that do suffer from delayed proceedings. From a qualitative point of view, we showhow the interactions occur mainly between the Public Prosecution (MPF) and the Comptroller (CGU) and between the latter and the Federal Police (PF). The Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) is portrayed as a remote institution that prefers interactions with local institutions andfocuses on governance. Lastly, the causal inferences reveal that while corruption may be important in the institutions decisions to interact as indicated by the results from the logistic regressions corruption is not important enough to expedite the progress of the cases and, when it has a significant impact, it leads to slower processes as indicated by the results of the survival analysis. Furthermore, the interactions are fundamental to expedite the arrival of the processes at the final stage of accountability, but do not contribute to faster sentencing.The theoretical perspective emphasizes that in order to hold officials accountable for their actions, managing to make them responsible for the exclusions that they may cause (such as corruption actions), the web of accountability institutions fulfill an important role of reinforcing and empowering democracy and its basic inclusive condition.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2015-09-25
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2019-08-14T09:28:59Z
2025-09-09T01:29:43Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2019-08-14T09:28:59Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis
format doctoralThesis
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUOS-A4RF5P
url https://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUOS-A4RF5P
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFMG
instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
instacron:UFMG
instname_str Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
instacron_str UFMG
institution UFMG
reponame_str Repositório Institucional da UFMG
collection Repositório Institucional da UFMG
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv https://repositorio.ufmg.br//bitstreams/7fd1203a-9e2d-476a-aa91-15586589f94e/download
https://repositorio.ufmg.br//bitstreams/f17802a2-21ec-4b0f-9e52-8e41fc52a6de/download
bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv defc844d26c9e83b7bbc11a73eccd035
c26d7f5dbc1ed9ea86dc9513d28ede4c
bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv MD5
MD5
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Institucional da UFMG - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv repositorio@ufmg.br
_version_ 1862105649357258752