O problema do não-ser no sofista de Platão

• Ano de defesa: 2008
• Autor(a) principal: Cavalcante Filho, Francisco de Assis Vale
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal da Paraí­ba; BR; Filosofia; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia; UFPB
• Palavras-chave em Português: Ser; Não-ser; Verdade; Falsidade; Contradição; Being; Not-being; Truth; Falsehood; Contradiction; CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/tede/5682

The work that follow directly inquire three issues selected by this analysis as the main problems in the dialogue Sofist of Plato. They are: the problem of being, the problem of non-be and the problem of negative. The problem of being in this dialogue is also the truth. This occurs from the fallacy identified with the "ontological concept of truth." This conception of truth is based on the following formulation: if we can only say "what is" as soon as someone speaks says what is and, therefore, says the real. The problem of non-being is the problem of falsehood. The problem of not-being directly connects to the problem of negative and is identified with a second fallacy in this Sofist: the fallacy that the negative should always be read as a contradiction. This conception of negative as contradiction raises a number of aporias. The negative should be read as a contradiction, only if each and every third term is excluded, as we see in the poem On Nature (Peri Physeos) of Parmenides, where there are only two terms, being, and this denial, the not-being. However, this is not the context in which either make Plato´s Sofist. The difficulty can be circumvented when we meet the second negative sense, id est, for all cases where there is a "third included," the third term in any relationship, identified in the text by "something" (ti) is to reformulate the "no" of negative. Thus the "no" should now be read as otherness rather than as opposition read as contrariety. The "ontological concept of truth" is linked directly to the ambiguity of the Greek verb "to be" (einai). To solve the problem Plato proposes a new conception of truth. Design that directly linked to the nature of speech and is seen as characteristic of what is said. Thus, truth and falsehood are to be regarded as property of the views expressed in a statement. They are presented here the three problems that our analysis attention, as well as those fallacies that motivate Plato´s solutions to the problems of being/truth, not-being/falsehood and the problem of negative.