Corruption and political marketing: a game theoretical approach

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2016
Autor(a) principal: ALBUQUERQUE, Emmanuel Felipe Patriota de
Orientador(a): RAMOS, Francisco de Sousa
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
dARK ID: ark:/64986/0013000000sj9
Idioma: eng
Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Pernambuco
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pos Graduacao em Economia
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: Brasil
Palavras-chave em Português:
Corrupção na política
Finanças públicas
Tática política
Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufpe.br/handle/123456789/24424
Resumo: We consider a game between a non-benevolent incumbent politician and a bu-reaucrat, where both can illegally appropriate public resources. The corrupt politician uses the resources to finance political campaigns and the bureaucrat to buy goods and services. Any illegal withdraw from the treasury diminishes the politician’s capability to improve social welfare. Politicians care about votes, bureaucrats care about money, and voters care about social welfare and are influenced by campaigns. We analyze the role of society’s educational level and of different punishing structures. We find that: i) an ill suited punishing scheme may increase state capture corruption; ii) the more educated the politician’s constituency is, the less lenient to corruption she will be; and iii) the more sensitive to marginal increases in corruption the punishing structure is, the smaller both players’ optimal illegal appropriation.
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spelling ALBUQUERQUE, Emmanuel Felipe Patriota dehttp://lattes.cnpq.br/5933281629023289http://lattes.cnpq.br/1190610699976105RAMOS, Francisco de SousaSAMPAIO, Breno Ramos2018-04-20T21:53:00Z2018-04-20T21:53:00Z2016-03-03https://repositorio.ufpe.br/handle/123456789/24424ark:/64986/0013000000sj9We consider a game between a non-benevolent incumbent politician and a bu-reaucrat, where both can illegally appropriate public resources. The corrupt politician uses the resources to finance political campaigns and the bureaucrat to buy goods and services. Any illegal withdraw from the treasury diminishes the politician’s capability to improve social welfare. Politicians care about votes, bureaucrats care about money, and voters care about social welfare and are influenced by campaigns. We analyze the role of society’s educational level and of different punishing structures. We find that: i) an ill suited punishing scheme may increase state capture corruption; ii) the more educated the politician’s constituency is, the less lenient to corruption she will be; and iii) the more sensitive to marginal increases in corruption the punishing structure is, the smaller both players’ optimal illegal appropriation.CNPQPropomos um jogo entre um político não benevolente e um burocrata, no qual ambos podem desviar recursos públicos ilegalmente. O político corrupto utiliza os recursos desviados para financiar campanhas políticas e o burocrata para comprar bens e serviços. Quanto maior a quantidade de recursos desviados, menos o político pode melhorar o bem-estar social. Políticos se importam com votos, burocratas se importam com dinheiro, e eleitores se importam com o bem-estar social e são influenciados por campanhas políticas. Analisamos o papel do nível educacional da sociedade e de diferentes estruturas de punição. Nossos principais resultados são: i) uma estrutura de punição mal elaborada pode aumentar corrupção do tipo state capture; ii) quanto mais educada a sociedade, menos o político será leniente com corrupção e menor será seu desvio ótimo; iii) quanto mais sensível a aumentos marginais de corrupção a estrutura de punição for, menor será o desvio ótimo dos jogadores.engUniversidade Federal de PernambucoPrograma de Pos Graduacao em EconomiaUFPEBrasilAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Brazilhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/br/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCorrupção na políticaFinanças públicasTática políticaCorruption and political marketing: a game theoretical approachinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesismestradoreponame:Repositório Institucional da UFPEinstname:Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE)instacron:UFPETHUMBNAILDISSERTAÇÃO Emmanuel Felipe Patriota de Albuquerque.pdf.jpgDISSERTAÇÃO Emmanuel Felipe Patriota de Albuquerque.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg1238https://repositorio.ufpe.br/bitstream/123456789/24424/5/DISSERTA%c3%87%c3%83O%20Emmanuel%20Felipe%20Patriota%20de%20Albuquerque.pdf.jpg886015801d3095bbafb640091255afd9MD55ORIGINALDISSERTAÇÃO Emmanuel Felipe Patriota de Albuquerque.pdfDISSERTAÇÃO Emmanuel Felipe Patriota de Albuquerque.pdfapplication/pdf638657https://repositorio.ufpe.br/bitstream/123456789/24424/1/DISSERTA%c3%87%c3%83O%20Emmanuel%20Felipe%20Patriota%20de%20Albuquerque.pdf7e4ea5027782cb93c70e0330eb553217MD51LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; 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dc.title.pt_BR.fl_str_mv Corruption and political marketing: a game theoretical approach
title Corruption and political marketing: a game theoretical approach
spellingShingle Corruption and political marketing: a game theoretical approach
ALBUQUERQUE, Emmanuel Felipe Patriota de
Corrupção na política
Finanças públicas
Tática política
title_short Corruption and political marketing: a game theoretical approach
title_full Corruption and political marketing: a game theoretical approach
title_fullStr Corruption and political marketing: a game theoretical approach
title_full_unstemmed Corruption and political marketing: a game theoretical approach
title_sort Corruption and political marketing: a game theoretical approach
author ALBUQUERQUE, Emmanuel Felipe Patriota de
author_facet ALBUQUERQUE, Emmanuel Felipe Patriota de
author_role author
dc.contributor.authorLattes.pt_BR.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/5933281629023289
dc.contributor.advisorLattes.pt_BR.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/1190610699976105
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv ALBUQUERQUE, Emmanuel Felipe Patriota de
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv RAMOS, Francisco de Sousa
dc.contributor.advisor-co1.fl_str_mv SAMPAIO, Breno Ramos
contributor_str_mv RAMOS, Francisco de Sousa
SAMPAIO, Breno Ramos
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Corrupção na política
Finanças públicas
Tática política
topic Corrupção na política
Finanças públicas
Tática política
description We consider a game between a non-benevolent incumbent politician and a bu-reaucrat, where both can illegally appropriate public resources. The corrupt politician uses the resources to finance political campaigns and the bureaucrat to buy goods and services. Any illegal withdraw from the treasury diminishes the politician’s capability to improve social welfare. Politicians care about votes, bureaucrats care about money, and voters care about social welfare and are influenced by campaigns. We analyze the role of society’s educational level and of different punishing structures. We find that: i) an ill suited punishing scheme may increase state capture corruption; ii) the more educated the politician’s constituency is, the less lenient to corruption she will be; and iii) the more sensitive to marginal increases in corruption the punishing structure is, the smaller both players’ optimal illegal appropriation.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2016-03-03
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2018-04-20T21:53:00Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2018-04-20T21:53:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://repositorio.ufpe.br/handle/123456789/24424
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dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/br/
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/br/
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Pernambuco
dc.publisher.program.fl_str_mv Programa de Pos Graduacao em Economia
dc.publisher.initials.fl_str_mv UFPE
dc.publisher.country.fl_str_mv Brasil
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Pernambuco
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