Liberdade e negação da vontade: análise do ser-livre como representação e na angústia

• Ano de defesa: 2011
• Autor(a) principal: Nascimento, Dax Fonseca Moraes Paes
• Orientador(a): Bauchwitz, Oscar Federico
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso embargado
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte
• Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
• Departamento: Metafísica
• País: BR
• Palavras-chave em Português: Vontade; Liberdade; Angústia; Existência; Representação; Singularidade
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Will; Freedom; Anguish; Existence; Representation; Oddity
• Área do conhecimento CNPq: CNPQ::LINGUISTICA, LETRAS E ARTES::LINGUISTICA
• Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufrn.br/jspui/handle/123456789/16453

Common understanding about what freedom means has always been more or less related to the power to realize something intended, desired, a capability. Therefore, being free is commonly interpreted under the concept of free-will and the category of possibility to act. Although there are predecessors in History of Philosophy, Schopenhauer refuses the thesis of free will proposing otherwise the denial of willing (to live) as the ultimate possibility for human freedom, if not the only one left. The thesis that would make him famous was deeply misunderstood and so miscarried somewhat due to the way it was many times presented by the means of exotic examples wrapped in a mystical mood besides exaltations to Eastern traditions, which may satisfy anthropological curiosity instead of being capable to satisfy the reader in a philosophical way. It seems to result from Schopenhauer s thought a kind of pessimism against life. Otherwise, typical readings on the Schopenhauerian thesis are found full of inconsistencies once closely regarded, which blame does not belong to the author but to his interpreters. A new reading about the denial of willing as the ultimate possibility for human freedom demands a criticism on the inconsistencies and prejudgments deep grounded. For this, we firstly clarify the ways of understanding the willing nothing , which cannot be reduced to the mere refusal or conformism, being instead positively understood as a special manner of willing: the admission of oneself for the sake of one is. A few more than a century later The world as will and representation came to light, Heidegger proposes in his fundamental ontology that the proper being-free concerns to originary decision by which, in anguish of being suspended in nothingness, Dasein renders itself singular as the being who is in-a-world and to-death, concluding that the ultimate possibility of freedom is being-free-to-death. Developing the hypothesis that freedom, properly understood, concerns to nothingness as to indeterminate possibilities, we seek for a dialogue between Schopenhauer s thought and existential philosophy aiming to reconstitute and overcome Metaphysics tradition turning the question about freedom into a matter of Ontology. From the factual existence perspective, as we must show, every human activity (or inactivity) is ordinarily mediated by representations, in which me and world appear as distinct entities. So, each one among determininate individuals finds itself connected to the things in the world by interest, which proper concept must be sufficiently explored. Starting from this point, we may proceed to detailed analysis of usual representations of freedom aiming their destruction by Ontology and then reaching existential thesis according to Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Turning back to the analysis of Schopenhauer s work, we conclude existential understanding of freedom as will-to-be can also be found in Schopenhauer. In this way, denial of willing means ultimate freedom once the Will turns back to its own essence by suppressing the world as representation, which means the originary absolute indetermination of the extreme possibility to-be