Comportamento oportunista em contratos agroindustriais: um exame multicaso-fuzzy para o estado do Rio Grande do Sul

• Ano de defesa: 2016
• Autor(a) principal: Sopeña, Mauro Barcellos
• Orientador(a): Arbage, Alessandro Porporatti
• Banca de defesa: Silveira, Vicente Celestino Pires , Magnago, Karine Faverzani , Machado, João Armando Dessimon , Viana, João Garibaldi Almeida
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Santa Maria
• Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pós-Graduação em Extensão Rural
• Departamento: Agronomia
• País: BR
• Palavras-chave em Português: Contratos agroindustriais; Comportamento oportunista; Estruturas de governança
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Agro-industrial contracts; Opportunistic behavior; Governance structures
• Área do conhecimento CNPq: CNPQ::CIENCIAS AGRARIAS::AGRONOMIA
• Link de acesso: http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/3831

This thesis examines agroindustrial contracts selected for the State of Rio Grande do Sul. From the williamsoniano concept of efficient governance, we seek to understand and measure how the opportunistic behaviour of agents is manifested on those governance structures, whereas the principle of contractual incompleteness. To do so, uses mixed methods analysis combining quantitative approach of fuzzy logic, with the qualitative contribution of parallel studies. The behavioral assumption of opportunism, of New Institutional Economics, is parsed for contracts of rice, fumicultura and pig farming. Purpose and a priori, the contracts are considered, respectively, as classics, and bilateral, neoclassical which corresponds to the contractual typology defined by Oliver Williamson from the relational theory of Ian MacNeil. When considering that each contractual model presents structural conditions and separate themselves from the others, the comparative analysis of the occurrence of opportunistic postures passes the import. Thus, the agro-industrial activities are analysed in terms of conformity with the theoretical models, using, for this, controllers or appropriate markers each governance structure. The fuzzy model developed for the measurement of the phenomenon consists of three categories of analysis: (a) the level of confidence that the agents have on the contractual counterpart (b) references that have next to their peers and (c) the importance we attach to the adoption of contractual safeguards. The qualitative analysis of each case contains, in addition to the interviews with the agents, processes, documentary research and observation visits to sectoral representative entities. Registers, from the analysis of the data, a strong correspondence between the results calculated in both methods, i.e. both plans showed the same tendency analysis on the attitude of the agents that validates, in some ways, the proposed model. The overall results of the work demonstrate a higher level of formal contracts, along with a greater complexity of contract, associated with a higher occurrence of opportunistic behaviour on the part of the agents this result suggested by literature, although with few analytical models. In this perspective, other order theoretical contributions were possible, especially when the behavioral assumption was cotejado with own attributes of the transaction. In General, the agreements examined revealed the existence of an important evaluation and evidence co-especificidade in assets, property is directly linked to the occurrence of opportunism via asymmetric information. This finding contributes to a more realistic analysis of those agro-industrial activities, as well as expand the concept of specific assets. Finally, a particular dimension concerning problems of asymmetric information in contracts was determined. The resulting proposition is supported in the notion of revelation and validation of the information by the agents, which represents a new and important dimension existing in those structural contracts.