Relação entre o gerenciamento de resultados e remuneração dos executivos por meio da divulgação de indicadores de desempenho

• Ano de defesa: 2022
• Autor(a) principal: Pavão, Gustavo Ramos
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• dARK ID: ark:/26339/0013000007spv
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Santa Maria; Brasil; Controladoria, Governança e Sustentabilidade; UFSM; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Contábeis; Centro de Ciências Sociais e Humanas
• Palavras-chave em Português: Remuneração de executivos; Gerenciamento de resultados; Indicadores de desempenho; Divulgação; Teoria da Agência; Executive compensation; Earnings management; Performance indicators; Disclosure; Agency theory; CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ADMINISTRACAO::CIENCIAS CONTABEIS
• Link de acesso: http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/27659

Even with the use of compensation system to align operational decision-making and organizational objectives, executive directors can practice earnings management by operational decisions to achieve higher compensation and, with that, increase the disclosure of performance indicators to justify the remuneration received. Based on Agency Theory, this research analyzes the relationship between variable remuneration and earnings management through operational decisions (handling discretionary expenses, handling sales and production) with the level of disclosure of performance indicators of the remuneration policy of 115 companies listed on B3 (Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão) from 2012 to 2019. The research is classified as quantitative, descriptive and documentary. Descriptive analysis, Granger Causality Test and panel data regression were performed. It was evidenced, through the analyzes that, in the companies of the analyzed sample, the variable remuneration has little representation in the remuneration policy of the Statutory Board. Earnings management through operational decisions was practiced in order to report higher profits. It appears that variable remuneration is not related to earning management through operational decisions. The level of disclosure of compensation performance indicators increases when production levels are manipulated and when total and long-term variable compensation increases. The results also reveal that the disclosure of remuneration performance indicators decreases when the values of short-term variable remuneration increase, but the manipulation of discretionary expenses and sales do not impact the level of disclosure of the indicators. It is concluded that the increase in variable remuneration is not a sufficient element to induce the manager to practice earnings management through operation decisions and that the disclosure of performance indicators of remuneration contracts is a tool used by management hide their management practices of results per production and present a well-structured remuneration system in order to justify the portion of remuneration received in a variable way.