Impacto do disclosure da remuneração dos executivos no desempenho, política de compensação, risco e liquidez: análise em países com fraca proteção legal
Ano de defesa: | 2022 |
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Autor(a) principal: | |
Orientador(a): | |
Banca de defesa: | |
Tipo de documento: | Tese |
Tipo de acesso: | Acesso aberto |
Idioma: | por |
Instituição de defesa: |
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria
Brasil Administração UFSM Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração Centro de Ciências Sociais e Humanas |
Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
Departamento: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
País: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
Palavras-chave em Português: | |
Link de acesso: | http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/24866 |
Resumo: | The separation between ownership and control made the occurrence of conflicts of interest between the parties interested in the firms inevitable, which, combined with an environment of informational asymmetries, led to agency problems. Corporate Governance emerges to mitigate these conflicts and, for this, proposes practices such as executive compensation policies and information disclosure. In recent years, the growing demand for information on executive compensation has led several countries to adopt stricter requirements regarding the disclosure of compensation packages. Specific characteristics of regions and nations, such as legal origin, shape different systems of Corporate Governance, influencing the temporal aspect the adoption regulation of remuneration disclosure. Given the above, the objective of this study is to identify the effect of mandatory disclosure of executive compensation on performance, compensation policy, risk, and liquidity of firms in countries with weak legal protection. Therefore, a quasi-experiment was carried out using the Difference-in-Differences (DID) method, in which the mandatory disclosure of executive compensation is assumed as an exogenous shock. Thus, the effect of the legal framework was compared on firms that were affected and on those that were not, before and after legal intervention, in countries of legal origin in French civil laws (Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Spain and Italy). Furthermore, for a joint analysis considering the influence of specificities and latent variables of the countries, multilevel generalized linear models were estimated. The main results indicate that the compulsory disclosure of executive compensation decreases the accounting performance of Brazilian firms, however, it increases the market performance of Argentine and Brazilian companies. Legal intervention reduces executive salaries but increases compensation for shares and options in Spanish companies, on the other hand, Brazilian managers receive higher total compensation. Regulating the disclosure of incentives to executives also reduces the market risk of firms in Brazil, Spain, and Italy, as well as the liquidity of Belgian and Brazilian companies. In the joint analysis between the countries, the results of the multilevel models suggest that the regulation of remuneration disclosure would be a good mechanism to combat agency problems, given that it increases accounting performance and decrease the proportion of resources held in cash by firms in countries with weak legal protection. |
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Impacto do disclosure da remuneração dos executivos no desempenho, política de compensação, risco e liquidez: análise em países com fraca proteção legalImpact of executive remuneration disclosure on performance, compensation policy, risk and liquidity: analysis in countries with weak legal protectionRemuneração dos executivosOrigem legalGovernança corporativaDisclosureExecutive compensationLegal originCorporate governanceCNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ADMINISTRACAOThe separation between ownership and control made the occurrence of conflicts of interest between the parties interested in the firms inevitable, which, combined with an environment of informational asymmetries, led to agency problems. Corporate Governance emerges to mitigate these conflicts and, for this, proposes practices such as executive compensation policies and information disclosure. In recent years, the growing demand for information on executive compensation has led several countries to adopt stricter requirements regarding the disclosure of compensation packages. Specific characteristics of regions and nations, such as legal origin, shape different systems of Corporate Governance, influencing the temporal aspect the adoption regulation of remuneration disclosure. Given the above, the objective of this study is to identify the effect of mandatory disclosure of executive compensation on performance, compensation policy, risk, and liquidity of firms in countries with weak legal protection. Therefore, a quasi-experiment was carried out using the Difference-in-Differences (DID) method, in which the mandatory disclosure of executive compensation is assumed as an exogenous shock. Thus, the effect of the legal framework was compared on firms that were affected and on those that were not, before and after legal intervention, in countries of legal origin in French civil laws (Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Spain and Italy). Furthermore, for a joint analysis considering the influence of specificities and latent variables of the countries, multilevel generalized linear models were estimated. The main results indicate that the compulsory disclosure of executive compensation decreases the accounting performance of Brazilian firms, however, it increases the market performance of Argentine and Brazilian companies. Legal intervention reduces executive salaries but increases compensation for shares and options in Spanish companies, on the other hand, Brazilian managers receive higher total compensation. Regulating the disclosure of incentives to executives also reduces the market risk of firms in Brazil, Spain, and Italy, as well as the liquidity of Belgian and Brazilian companies. In the joint analysis between the countries, the results of the multilevel models suggest that the regulation of remuneration disclosure would be a good mechanism to combat agency problems, given that it increases accounting performance and decrease the proportion of resources held in cash by firms in countries with weak legal protection.A separação entre propriedade e controle tornou inevitável a ocorrência de conflitos de interesses entre as partes interessadas nas firmas, os quais, aliados a um ambiente de assimetrias informacionais, acarretaram problemas de agência. A Governança Corporativa tende a mitigar esses conflitos e, para isso, propõe práticas como políticas de compensação de executivos e disclosure de informações. Nos últimos anos, a crescente demanda por informações sobre a remuneração dos executivos levou diversos países a adotar requisitos mais rígidos quanto ao disclosure dos pacotes de compensação. Características específicas das regiões e nações, como a origem legal, moldam diferentes sistemas de Governança Corporativa, influenciando no aspecto temporal da adoção de regulamentação do disclosure da remuneração. Diante do exposto, o objetivo desse estudo é identificar o efeito do disclosure obrigatório da remuneração dos executivos no desempenho, política de compensação, risco e liquidez de firmas em países com fraca proteção legal. Para tanto, realizou-se um quase-experimento por meio do método Diferença-em-Diferenças (DID), no qual assume-se como choque exógeno a obrigatoriedade do disclosure da remuneração dos executivos. Destarte, comparou-se o efeito do marco legal nas firmas que foram afetas e naquelas que não foram, antes e após a intervenção legal, em países de origem legal em leis civis francesas (Argentina, Bélgica, Brasil, Espanha e Itália). Além disso, para uma análise conjunta considerando a influência de especificidades e variáveis latentes dos países, foram estimados modelos lineares generalizados multinível. Os principais resultados apontam que o disclosure compulsório da remuneração dos executivos diminui o desempenho contábil de firmas do Brasil, contudo, aumenta o desempenho de mercado em empresas argentinas e brasileiras. A intervenção legal reduz os salários dos executivos, mas aumenta a compensação por ações e opções em companhias espanholas, por outro lado, gestores brasileiros recebem maior remuneração total. A regulamentação do disclosure dos incentivos aos executivos também reduz o risco de mercado de firmas no Brasil, Espanha e Itália, assim como a liquidez em companhias belgas e brasileiras. Na análise conjunta entre os países, os resultados dos modelos multinível sugerem que a regulamentação do disclosure da remuneração contribui como um bom mecanismo de combate aos problemas de agência, dado que aumenta o desempenho contábil e diminui a proporção de recursos retidos em caixa de firmas em países com fraca proteção legal.Universidade Federal de Santa MariaBrasilAdministraçãoUFSMPrograma de Pós-Graduação em AdministraçãoCentro de Ciências Sociais e HumanasSonza, Igor Bernardihttp://lattes.cnpq.br/0001554374469356Ceretta, Paulo SergioDegenhart, LarissaMacagnan, Clea BeatrizNakamura, Wilson ToshiroMachado, Vagner Naysinger2022-06-15T13:39:11Z2022-06-15T13:39:11Z2022-04-27info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisapplication/pdfhttp://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/24866porAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSMinstname:Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)instacron:UFSM2022-06-15T13:39:11Zoai:repositorio.ufsm.br:1/24866Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertaçõeshttps://repositorio.ufsm.br/ONGhttps://repositorio.ufsm.br/oai/requestatendimento.sib@ufsm.br||tedebc@gmail.comopendoar:2022-06-15T13:39:11Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Impacto do disclosure da remuneração dos executivos no desempenho, política de compensação, risco e liquidez: análise em países com fraca proteção legal Impact of executive remuneration disclosure on performance, compensation policy, risk and liquidity: analysis in countries with weak legal protection |
title |
Impacto do disclosure da remuneração dos executivos no desempenho, política de compensação, risco e liquidez: análise em países com fraca proteção legal |
spellingShingle |
Impacto do disclosure da remuneração dos executivos no desempenho, política de compensação, risco e liquidez: análise em países com fraca proteção legal Machado, Vagner Naysinger Remuneração dos executivos Origem legal Governança corporativa Disclosure Executive compensation Legal origin Corporate governance CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ADMINISTRACAO |
title_short |
Impacto do disclosure da remuneração dos executivos no desempenho, política de compensação, risco e liquidez: análise em países com fraca proteção legal |
title_full |
Impacto do disclosure da remuneração dos executivos no desempenho, política de compensação, risco e liquidez: análise em países com fraca proteção legal |
title_fullStr |
Impacto do disclosure da remuneração dos executivos no desempenho, política de compensação, risco e liquidez: análise em países com fraca proteção legal |
title_full_unstemmed |
Impacto do disclosure da remuneração dos executivos no desempenho, política de compensação, risco e liquidez: análise em países com fraca proteção legal |
title_sort |
Impacto do disclosure da remuneração dos executivos no desempenho, política de compensação, risco e liquidez: análise em países com fraca proteção legal |
author |
Machado, Vagner Naysinger |
author_facet |
Machado, Vagner Naysinger |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Sonza, Igor Bernardi http://lattes.cnpq.br/0001554374469356 Ceretta, Paulo Sergio Degenhart, Larissa Macagnan, Clea Beatriz Nakamura, Wilson Toshiro |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Machado, Vagner Naysinger |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Remuneração dos executivos Origem legal Governança corporativa Disclosure Executive compensation Legal origin Corporate governance CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ADMINISTRACAO |
topic |
Remuneração dos executivos Origem legal Governança corporativa Disclosure Executive compensation Legal origin Corporate governance CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ADMINISTRACAO |
description |
The separation between ownership and control made the occurrence of conflicts of interest between the parties interested in the firms inevitable, which, combined with an environment of informational asymmetries, led to agency problems. Corporate Governance emerges to mitigate these conflicts and, for this, proposes practices such as executive compensation policies and information disclosure. In recent years, the growing demand for information on executive compensation has led several countries to adopt stricter requirements regarding the disclosure of compensation packages. Specific characteristics of regions and nations, such as legal origin, shape different systems of Corporate Governance, influencing the temporal aspect the adoption regulation of remuneration disclosure. Given the above, the objective of this study is to identify the effect of mandatory disclosure of executive compensation on performance, compensation policy, risk, and liquidity of firms in countries with weak legal protection. Therefore, a quasi-experiment was carried out using the Difference-in-Differences (DID) method, in which the mandatory disclosure of executive compensation is assumed as an exogenous shock. Thus, the effect of the legal framework was compared on firms that were affected and on those that were not, before and after legal intervention, in countries of legal origin in French civil laws (Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Spain and Italy). Furthermore, for a joint analysis considering the influence of specificities and latent variables of the countries, multilevel generalized linear models were estimated. The main results indicate that the compulsory disclosure of executive compensation decreases the accounting performance of Brazilian firms, however, it increases the market performance of Argentine and Brazilian companies. Legal intervention reduces executive salaries but increases compensation for shares and options in Spanish companies, on the other hand, Brazilian managers receive higher total compensation. Regulating the disclosure of incentives to executives also reduces the market risk of firms in Brazil, Spain, and Italy, as well as the liquidity of Belgian and Brazilian companies. In the joint analysis between the countries, the results of the multilevel models suggest that the regulation of remuneration disclosure would be a good mechanism to combat agency problems, given that it increases accounting performance and decrease the proportion of resources held in cash by firms in countries with weak legal protection. |
publishDate |
2022 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2022-06-15T13:39:11Z 2022-06-15T13:39:11Z 2022-04-27 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
format |
doctoralThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/24866 |
url |
http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/24866 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria Brasil Administração UFSM Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração Centro de Ciências Sociais e Humanas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria Brasil Administração UFSM Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração Centro de Ciências Sociais e Humanas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) instacron:UFSM |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) |
instacron_str |
UFSM |
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UFSM |
reponame_str |
Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM |
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Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
atendimento.sib@ufsm.br||tedebc@gmail.com |
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1805930159678685184 |