Explicando o fenômeno da impregnação teórica da percepção a partir de críticas à tese da modularidade da mente

• Ano de defesa: 2014
• Autor(a) principal: Nascimento, Laura Machado do
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• dARK ID: ark:/26339/0013000016ntz
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Santa Maria; BR; Filosofia; UFSM; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
• Palavras-chave em Português: Percepção; Impregnação teórica da percepção; Modularidade da mente; Enativismo; Perception; Theory-ladenness of perception; Modularity of mind; Enactivism; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9131

The theory-ladenness of perception thesis claims that the perception of different subjects might differ depending on prior knowledge, concepts and theories they hold. Oftentimes this thesis is associated with relativistic views, and therefore rejected. One of the strategies introduced to avoid the theory-ladenness of perception consists in affirming a strong version of the modularity of mind thesis, put forth by Fodor (1983). According to this thesis, some of the processing stages of perception would be performed by informationally encapsuled modules. This dissertation contains two independent papers, the first of which questions the empirical and theoretical plausibility of informational encapsulation of the perceptual modules. The second paper puts forth arguments for an enactivist view of the mind, in which the thesis of the theory-ladenness of perception is not thought to be problematic, but an essential element. This latter paper draws mainly on Noë (2004, 2009, 2012), and defends a version of the thesis of the theory-ladenness of perception grounded in the practice and the abilities of perceiving organisms in the physical environments in which they find themselves and with which they interact.