Rights as trumps : an analysis of Ronald Dworkin's theory of rights

• Ano de defesa: 2021
• Autor(a) principal: Goulart, André Coletto Pedroso
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: eng
• Instituição de defesa: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
• Palavras-chave em Português: Direitos como Trunfos; Direitos Fundamentais; Fundamental Rights; Rights as Trumps; Ronald Dworkin; Teoria dos Direitos; Theory of Rights
• Link de acesso: https://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2139/tde-26092022-090132/

Ronald Dworkin offered increasingly refined versions of his theory of rights throughout his work. The purpose of this dissertation is to assess whether, after all, he was able to improve our understanding of rights. I ultimately argue that he did succeed in this endeavour. This dissertation proceeds in three stages. In its first part, I present what I consider to be the best account of Dworkins theory of rights, mainly based on his later work. I read his theory of rights in light of two important axes, which I call as his interpretative and ethical turns. According to the former, a concrete claim based on a right shares the same structure as other interpretative moral claims. As such, it assumes a specific sense of objectivity and it is true if what it requires is coherent and advances the values a right protects. According to the latter, the protection of the dignity of the members of a political community is the substantive purpose or point of our rights. So, a claim based on rights must succeed if it promotes the ultimately ethical values associated with human dignity. In this sense, rights work as political trumps: so far as they protect human dignity, they trump other reasons for political action. In the second part of this dissertation, I test this interpretation against some challenges that have been offered against Dworkins theory of rights. I then critically assess and present responses to these challenges. In the final part of this dissertation, I conclude that far from being an empty slogan, Dworkins understanding of rights as trumps is the result of a careful philosophical investigation of attitudes and relationships that are key features of our form of life. In this way, Dworkin presents an appealing account of the place of our rights in the larger domain of values, mapping out and justifying their connections with other indispensable concepts of ethics and political morality.