Identifying and evaluating the political determinants of subnational debt

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2020
Autor(a) principal: Gabriel Zanlorenssi
Orientador(a): Lorena Guadalupe Barberia
Banca de defesa: George Avelino Filho, Fabiana Fontes Rocha
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: eng
Instituição de defesa: Universidade de São Paulo
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Ciência Política
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: BR
Link de acesso: https://doi.org/10.11606/D.8.2020.tde-26052020-223526
Resumo: This dissertation aims to evaluate the Brazilian subnational debt policy since 2002. After a series of reforms initiated in 1997, the federal government adopted stricter rules for approving new loans to Brazilian states that directed greater authority for the approval or rejection of these contracts. The analysis of the loans that were approved from 2002 to 2018 shows that the federal government plays an even more important role in the concession of domestic loans because the main creditors of the states are federal public banks. For rule-based top-down models of subnational debt to work, scal requirements must not be relaxed and there must be no party favoritism in the lending process. Otherwise, there is an inherent risk over the scal stability of subnational entities. This study explores whether there are differences between internal and external debt approvals since the federal government has less inuence on the agreements signed with foreign institutions. Using a rare-logit model (KING; ZENG, 2001), loan approval probabilities were estimated. Results show that political factors have a signicantly stronger affect on the approval of domestic contracts. Party alignment with the president increases the chances of approval of a loan in the internal way. Moreover, in contrary of the external loans, the indebtedness level of the states does not affect the success rates in getting loans. These results present evidence that although Brazil has reduced the scope for opportunistic behavior in accessing debt at the sub-national level, there are political factors that affect the success of Brazilian states in their debt strategies.
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spelling info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis Identifying and evaluating the political determinants of subnational debt Identificando e avaliando os determinantes políticos do endividamento subnacional 2020-02-04Lorena Guadalupe BarberiaGeorge Avelino FilhoFabiana Fontes RochaGabriel ZanlorenssiUniversidade de São PauloCiência PolíticaUSPBR Brasil Brazil Debt policy Dívida estadual Federalism Federalismo Política de endividamento Políticas fiscais subnacionais State debt Subnational fiscal policies This dissertation aims to evaluate the Brazilian subnational debt policy since 2002. After a series of reforms initiated in 1997, the federal government adopted stricter rules for approving new loans to Brazilian states that directed greater authority for the approval or rejection of these contracts. The analysis of the loans that were approved from 2002 to 2018 shows that the federal government plays an even more important role in the concession of domestic loans because the main creditors of the states are federal public banks. For rule-based top-down models of subnational debt to work, scal requirements must not be relaxed and there must be no party favoritism in the lending process. Otherwise, there is an inherent risk over the scal stability of subnational entities. This study explores whether there are differences between internal and external debt approvals since the federal government has less inuence on the agreements signed with foreign institutions. Using a rare-logit model (KING; ZENG, 2001), loan approval probabilities were estimated. Results show that political factors have a signicantly stronger affect on the approval of domestic contracts. Party alignment with the president increases the chances of approval of a loan in the internal way. Moreover, in contrary of the external loans, the indebtedness level of the states does not affect the success rates in getting loans. These results present evidence that although Brazil has reduced the scope for opportunistic behavior in accessing debt at the sub-national level, there are political factors that affect the success of Brazilian states in their debt strategies. Essa dissertação tem como objetivo avaliar a política de endividamento subnacional brasileira, desde 2002. Após uma série de reformas inicidas em 1997, o país adotou regras mais rígidas para aprovação de novos empréstimos aos estados brasileiros, centralizando no governo federal a aprovação ou rejeição destes contratos. A análise do crédito concedido no período que vai de 2002 a 2018 mostra que a União tem um papel ainda mais importante neste processo pois os principais credores dos estados são os bancos públicos federais. Para que modelos top-down de endividamento subnacional, baseados em regras funcionem, é necessário que as exigências scais não sejam relaxadas e não haja favoritismo partidário na concessão do empréstimo. Caso contrário, há um risco inerente à estabilidade scal dos entes subnacionais. Atenção especial foi dada a possíveis diferenças entre contratos internos e externos de endividamento, pois o governo federal têm menor inuencia nos contratos rmados com instituições estrangeiras. A partir de um modelo rare logit, as probabilidades de aprovação de contrato foram estimadas. Resultados mostram que a interferência de fatores políticos é signicativamente mais forte nos contratos internos. O alinhamento partidário com o presidente aumenta as chances de aprovação de um empréstimo pela via interna. Mais ainda, ao contrário da via externa, o grau de endividamento dos estados não afeta as taxas de sucesso ao conseguir empréstimos. Estes resultados apresentam evidências que ainda que o Brasil tenha reduzido o espaço para comportamento oportunista no acesso ao endividamento, há fatores políticos que impactam o sucesso dos estados brasileiros em suas estratégias de endividamento. https://doi.org/10.11606/D.8.2020.tde-26052020-223526info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessengreponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USPinstname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)instacron:USP2023-12-21T20:12:17Zoai:teses.usp.br:tde-26052020-223526Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertaçõeshttp://www.teses.usp.br/PUBhttp://www.teses.usp.br/cgi-bin/mtd2br.plvirginia@if.usp.br|| atendimento@aguia.usp.br||virginia@if.usp.bropendoar:27212020-05-28T01:38:01Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)false
dc.title.en.fl_str_mv Identifying and evaluating the political determinants of subnational debt
dc.title.alternative.pt.fl_str_mv Identificando e avaliando os determinantes políticos do endividamento subnacional
title Identifying and evaluating the political determinants of subnational debt
spellingShingle Identifying and evaluating the political determinants of subnational debt
Gabriel Zanlorenssi
title_short Identifying and evaluating the political determinants of subnational debt
title_full Identifying and evaluating the political determinants of subnational debt
title_fullStr Identifying and evaluating the political determinants of subnational debt
title_full_unstemmed Identifying and evaluating the political determinants of subnational debt
title_sort Identifying and evaluating the political determinants of subnational debt
author Gabriel Zanlorenssi
author_facet Gabriel Zanlorenssi
author_role author
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv Lorena Guadalupe Barberia
dc.contributor.referee1.fl_str_mv George Avelino Filho
dc.contributor.referee2.fl_str_mv Fabiana Fontes Rocha
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Gabriel Zanlorenssi
contributor_str_mv Lorena Guadalupe Barberia
George Avelino Filho
Fabiana Fontes Rocha
description This dissertation aims to evaluate the Brazilian subnational debt policy since 2002. After a series of reforms initiated in 1997, the federal government adopted stricter rules for approving new loans to Brazilian states that directed greater authority for the approval or rejection of these contracts. The analysis of the loans that were approved from 2002 to 2018 shows that the federal government plays an even more important role in the concession of domestic loans because the main creditors of the states are federal public banks. For rule-based top-down models of subnational debt to work, scal requirements must not be relaxed and there must be no party favoritism in the lending process. Otherwise, there is an inherent risk over the scal stability of subnational entities. This study explores whether there are differences between internal and external debt approvals since the federal government has less inuence on the agreements signed with foreign institutions. Using a rare-logit model (KING; ZENG, 2001), loan approval probabilities were estimated. Results show that political factors have a signicantly stronger affect on the approval of domestic contracts. Party alignment with the president increases the chances of approval of a loan in the internal way. Moreover, in contrary of the external loans, the indebtedness level of the states does not affect the success rates in getting loans. These results present evidence that although Brazil has reduced the scope for opportunistic behavior in accessing debt at the sub-national level, there are political factors that affect the success of Brazilian states in their debt strategies.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2020-02-04
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.11606/D.8.2020.tde-26052020-223526
url https://doi.org/10.11606/D.8.2020.tde-26052020-223526
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de São Paulo
dc.publisher.program.fl_str_mv Ciência Política
dc.publisher.initials.fl_str_mv USP
dc.publisher.country.fl_str_mv BR
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de São Paulo
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instname_str Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
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reponame_str Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da USP - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
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