Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow.
| Ano de defesa: | 2018 |
|---|---|
| Autor(a) principal: | |
| Orientador(a): | |
| Banca de defesa: | |
| Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
| Tipo de acesso: | Acesso aberto |
| Idioma: | por |
| Instituição de defesa: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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| Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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| Departamento: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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| País: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
| Palavras-chave em Português: | |
| Link de acesso: | http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/38773 |
Resumo: | Throughout history, several researchers have suggested different electoral systems that were intended to define a fair or ethical way of expressing the "popular will" over a certain set of choices. The focus of this work is on ranking polling systems where, instead of each citizen voting simply for the best candidate (on his / her opinion), he / she should vote in an order on all possible candidates (or options) in an election. The system must then, following a predetermined set of rules, produce an "elected order" by the population. In this work, we study some properties that are usually expected, or if desired, for such a system to be considered fair. We note that the outcome of an election can change dramatically when using different systems, even though both systems seem, a priori, to return fair choices. This confirms that the outcome of an election is directly linked to the type of electoral system that is adopted. We also make an analysis of several influential systems throughout the history of the so-called "Social Choice Theory". Finally, we end by showing a demonstration of Arrow's influential Theorem of Impossibility, which says that in ranking voting systems certain important conditions and can not be met simultaneously. We conclude, then, that in democratic polls it is necessary to give up one of these properties (or not to use a system by rank). In this way, the study of the most common electoral systems has a sophisticated role in helping us to define, criticize or influence the electoral system used in an election, helping us to perceive the strengths and weaknesses of each one of them. |
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Mitchel, Daniel PiresBenevides, Fabricio Siqueira2019-01-10T12:55:12Z2019-01-10T12:55:12Z2018MITCHEL, Daniel Pires. Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow. 55 f. Dissertação (Mestrado Profissional em Matemática em Rede Nacional) - Centro de Ciências, Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza, 2018.http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/38773Throughout history, several researchers have suggested different electoral systems that were intended to define a fair or ethical way of expressing the "popular will" over a certain set of choices. The focus of this work is on ranking polling systems where, instead of each citizen voting simply for the best candidate (on his / her opinion), he / she should vote in an order on all possible candidates (or options) in an election. The system must then, following a predetermined set of rules, produce an "elected order" by the population. In this work, we study some properties that are usually expected, or if desired, for such a system to be considered fair. We note that the outcome of an election can change dramatically when using different systems, even though both systems seem, a priori, to return fair choices. This confirms that the outcome of an election is directly linked to the type of electoral system that is adopted. We also make an analysis of several influential systems throughout the history of the so-called "Social Choice Theory". Finally, we end by showing a demonstration of Arrow's influential Theorem of Impossibility, which says that in ranking voting systems certain important conditions and can not be met simultaneously. We conclude, then, that in democratic polls it is necessary to give up one of these properties (or not to use a system by rank). In this way, the study of the most common electoral systems has a sophisticated role in helping us to define, criticize or influence the electoral system used in an election, helping us to perceive the strengths and weaknesses of each one of them.Ao longo da história, vários pesquisadores sugeriram diferentes sistemas eleitorais que tinham como intuito definir uma maneira justa ou ética de expressar a “vontade popular” sobre um certo conjunto de escolhas. O foco desse trabalho é em sistemas de votação por ranqueamento em que, ao invés de cada cidadão votar simplesmente no melhor candidato (em sua opnião), ele deverá votar em uma ordem sobre todos os possíveis candidatos (ou opções) de uma eleição. O sistema deve, então, seguindo um conjunto pré-determinado de regras, produzir uma “ordem eleita” pela população. Neste trabalho, estudamos algumas propriedades que usualmente se espera, ou se deseja, para que um tal sistema seja considerado justo. Observamos que o resultado de uma eleição pode mudar dramaticamente quando se usa sistemas diferentes, mesmo que ambos os sistemas parecem, à priori, retornar escolhas justas. Isso confirma que resultado de uma eleição está diretamente ligado ao tipo de sistema eleitoral que é adotado. Fazemos também uma análise de vários sistemas influentes ao longo da história da então chamada “Teoria da Escolha Social” para, enfim, terminamos exibindo uma demonstração do influente Teorema da Impossilidade de Arrow, que diz que em sistemas de votação por ranqueamento certas condições importantes e naturais não podem ser satisfeitas simultamente. Concluímos, então, que em votações democráticas é necessário abrir mão de uma dessas propriedades (ou não usar um sistema por ranqueamento). Dessa forma, o estudo dos sistemas eleitorais mais comuns tem um papel sofisticado em nos ajudar a definir, criticar ou influenciar o sistema eleitorial utilizado em uma eleição, nos ajudando a perceber os pontos fortes e fracos de cada um deles.Sistemas de votaçãoTeorema de ArrowTeoria da escolha socialVoting systemsArrow TheoremTheory of social choiceSistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow.Voting systems and Arrow's impossibility theorem.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisporreponame:Repositório Institucional da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)instacron:UFCinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessORIGINAL2018_dis_dpmitchel.pdf2018_dis_dpmitchel.pdfapplication/pdf1832616http://repositorio.ufc.br/bitstream/riufc/38773/1/2018_dis_dpmitchel.pdfd6df18f14727c6d416b96ae5cbe9dce9MD51LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-81748http://repositorio.ufc.br/bitstream/riufc/38773/2/license.txt8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33MD52riufc/387732019-01-10 09:55:12.44oai:repositorio.ufc.br:riufc/38773Tk9URTogUExBQ0UgWU9VUiBPV04gTElDRU5TRSBIRVJFClRoaXMgc2FtcGxlIGxpY2Vuc2UgaXMgcHJvdmlkZWQgZm9yIGluZm9ybWF0aW9uYWwgcHVycG9zZXMgb25seS4KCk5PTi1FWENMVVNJVkUgRElTVFJJQlVUSU9OIExJQ0VOU0UKCkJ5IHNpZ25pbmcgYW5kIHN1Ym1pdHRpbmcgdGhpcyBsaWNlbnNlLCB5b3UgKHRoZSBhdXRob3Iocykgb3IgY29weXJpZ2h0Cm93bmVyKSBncmFudHMgdG8gRFNwYWNlIFVuaXZlcnNpdHkgKERTVSkgdGhlIG5vbi1leGNsdXNpdmUgcmlnaHQgdG8gcmVwcm9kdWNlLAp0cmFuc2xhdGUgKGFzIGRlZmluZWQgYmVsb3cpLCBhbmQvb3IgZGlzdHJpYnV0ZSB5b3VyIHN1Ym1pc3Npb24gKGluY2x1ZGluZwp0aGUgYWJzdHJhY3QpIHdvcmxkd2lkZSBpbiBwcmludCBhbmQgZWxlY3Ryb25pYyBmb3JtYXQgYW5kIGluIGFueSBtZWRpdW0sCmluY2x1ZGluZyBidXQgbm90IGxpbWl0ZWQgdG8gYXVkaW8gb3IgdmlkZW8uCgpZb3UgYWdyZWUgdGhhdCBEU1UgbWF5LCB3aXRob3V0IGNoYW5naW5nIHRoZSBjb250ZW50LCB0cmFuc2xhdGUgdGhlCnN1Ym1pc3Npb24gdG8gYW55IG1lZGl1bSBvciBmb3JtYXQgZm9yIHRoZSBwdXJwb3NlIG9mIHByZXNlcnZhdGlvbi4KCllvdSBhbHNvIGFncmVlIHRoYXQgRFNVIG1heSBrZWVwIG1vcmUgdGhhbiBvbmUgY29weSBvZiB0aGlzIHN1Ym1pc3Npb24gZm9yCnB1cnBvc2VzIG9mIHNlY3VyaXR5LCBiYWNrLXVwIGFuZCBwcmVzZXJ2YXRpb24uCgpZb3UgcmVwcmVzZW50IHRoYXQgdGhlIHN1Ym1pc3Npb24gaXMgeW91ciBvcmlnaW5hbCB3b3JrLCBhbmQgdGhhdCB5b3UgaGF2ZQp0aGUgcmlnaHQgdG8gZ3JhbnQgdGhlIHJpZ2h0cyBjb250YWluZWQgaW4gdGhpcyBsaWNlbnNlLiBZb3UgYWxzbyByZXByZXNlbnQKdGhhdCB5b3VyIHN1Ym1pc3Npb24gZG9lcyBub3QsIHRvIHRoZSBiZXN0IG9mIHlvdXIga25vd2xlZGdlLCBpbmZyaW5nZSB1cG9uCmFueW9uZSdzIGNvcHlyaWdodC4KCklmIHRoZSBzdWJtaXNzaW9uIGNvbnRhaW5zIG1hdGVyaWFsIGZvciB3aGljaCB5b3UgZG8gbm90IGhvbGQgY29weXJpZ2h0LAp5b3UgcmVwcmVzZW50IHRoYXQgeW91IGhhdmUgb2J0YWluZWQgdGhlIHVucmVzdHJpY3RlZCBwZXJtaXNzaW9uIG9mIHRoZQpjb3B5cmlnaHQgb3duZXIgdG8gZ3JhbnQgRFNVIHRoZSByaWdodHMgcmVxdWlyZWQgYnkgdGhpcyBsaWNlbnNlLCBhbmQgdGhhdApzdWNoIHRoaXJkLXBhcnR5IG93bmVkIG1hdGVyaWFsIGlzIGNsZWFybHkgaWRlbnRpZmllZCBhbmQgYWNrbm93bGVkZ2VkCndpdGhpbiB0aGUgdGV4dCBvciBjb250ZW50IG9mIHRoZSBzdWJtaXNzaW9uLgoKSUYgVEhFIFNVQk1JU1NJT04gSVMgQkFTRUQgVVBPTiBXT1JLIFRIQVQgSEFTIEJFRU4gU1BPTlNPUkVEIE9SIFNVUFBPUlRFRApCWSBBTiBBR0VOQ1kgT1IgT1JHQU5JWkFUSU9OIE9USEVSIFRIQU4gRFNVLCBZT1UgUkVQUkVTRU5UIFRIQVQgWU9VIEhBVkUKRlVMRklMTEVEIEFOWSBSSUdIVCBPRiBSRVZJRVcgT1IgT1RIRVIgT0JMSUdBVElPTlMgUkVRVUlSRUQgQlkgU1VDSApDT05UUkFDVCBPUiBBR1JFRU1FTlQuCgpEU1Ugd2lsbCBjbGVhcmx5IGlkZW50aWZ5IHlvdXIgbmFtZShzKSBhcyB0aGUgYXV0aG9yKHMpIG9yIG93bmVyKHMpIG9mIHRoZQpzdWJtaXNzaW9uLCBhbmQgd2lsbCBub3QgbWFrZSBhbnkgYWx0ZXJhdGlvbiwgb3RoZXIgdGhhbiBhcyBhbGxvd2VkIGJ5IHRoaXMKbGljZW5zZSwgdG8geW91ciBzdWJtaXNzaW9uLgo=Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttp://www.repositorio.ufc.br/ri-oai/requestbu@ufc.br || repositorio@ufc.bropendoar:2019-01-10T12:55:12Repositório Institucional da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)false |
| dc.title.pt_BR.fl_str_mv |
Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow. |
| dc.title.en.pt_BR.fl_str_mv |
Voting systems and Arrow's impossibility theorem. |
| title |
Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow. |
| spellingShingle |
Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow. Mitchel, Daniel Pires Sistemas de votação Teorema de Arrow Teoria da escolha social Voting systems Arrow Theorem Theory of social choice |
| title_short |
Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow. |
| title_full |
Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow. |
| title_fullStr |
Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow. |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow. |
| title_sort |
Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow. |
| author |
Mitchel, Daniel Pires |
| author_facet |
Mitchel, Daniel Pires |
| author_role |
author |
| dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Mitchel, Daniel Pires |
| dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv |
Benevides, Fabricio Siqueira |
| contributor_str_mv |
Benevides, Fabricio Siqueira |
| dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Sistemas de votação Teorema de Arrow Teoria da escolha social Voting systems Arrow Theorem Theory of social choice |
| topic |
Sistemas de votação Teorema de Arrow Teoria da escolha social Voting systems Arrow Theorem Theory of social choice |
| description |
Throughout history, several researchers have suggested different electoral systems that were intended to define a fair or ethical way of expressing the "popular will" over a certain set of choices. The focus of this work is on ranking polling systems where, instead of each citizen voting simply for the best candidate (on his / her opinion), he / she should vote in an order on all possible candidates (or options) in an election. The system must then, following a predetermined set of rules, produce an "elected order" by the population. In this work, we study some properties that are usually expected, or if desired, for such a system to be considered fair. We note that the outcome of an election can change dramatically when using different systems, even though both systems seem, a priori, to return fair choices. This confirms that the outcome of an election is directly linked to the type of electoral system that is adopted. We also make an analysis of several influential systems throughout the history of the so-called "Social Choice Theory". Finally, we end by showing a demonstration of Arrow's influential Theorem of Impossibility, which says that in ranking voting systems certain important conditions and can not be met simultaneously. We conclude, then, that in democratic polls it is necessary to give up one of these properties (or not to use a system by rank). In this way, the study of the most common electoral systems has a sophisticated role in helping us to define, criticize or influence the electoral system used in an election, helping us to perceive the strengths and weaknesses of each one of them. |
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2018 |
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2018 |
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2019-01-10T12:55:12Z |
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MITCHEL, Daniel Pires. Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow. 55 f. Dissertação (Mestrado Profissional em Matemática em Rede Nacional) - Centro de Ciências, Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza, 2018. |
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