Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow.

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2018
Autor(a) principal: Mitchel, Daniel Pires
Orientador(a): Benevides, Fabricio Siqueira
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Não Informado pela instituição
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: Não Informado pela instituição
Palavras-chave em Português:
Link de acesso: http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/38773
Resumo: Throughout history, several researchers have suggested different electoral systems that were intended to define a fair or ethical way of expressing the "popular will" over a certain set of choices. The focus of this work is on ranking polling systems where, instead of each citizen voting simply for the best candidate (on his / her opinion), he / she should vote in an order on all possible candidates (or options) in an election. The system must then, following a predetermined set of rules, produce an "elected order" by the population. In this work, we study some properties that are usually expected, or if desired, for such a system to be considered fair. We note that the outcome of an election can change dramatically when using different systems, even though both systems seem, a priori, to return fair choices. This confirms that the outcome of an election is directly linked to the type of electoral system that is adopted. We also make an analysis of several influential systems throughout the history of the so-called "Social Choice Theory". Finally, we end by showing a demonstration of Arrow's influential Theorem of Impossibility, which says that in ranking voting systems certain important conditions and can not be met simultaneously. We conclude, then, that in democratic polls it is necessary to give up one of these properties (or not to use a system by rank). In this way, the study of the most common electoral systems has a sophisticated role in helping us to define, criticize or influence the electoral system used in an election, helping us to perceive the strengths and weaknesses of each one of them.
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spelling Mitchel, Daniel PiresBenevides, Fabricio Siqueira2019-01-10T12:55:12Z2019-01-10T12:55:12Z2018MITCHEL, Daniel Pires. Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow. 55 f. Dissertação (Mestrado Profissional em Matemática em Rede Nacional) - Centro de Ciências, Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza, 2018.http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/38773Throughout history, several researchers have suggested different electoral systems that were intended to define a fair or ethical way of expressing the "popular will" over a certain set of choices. The focus of this work is on ranking polling systems where, instead of each citizen voting simply for the best candidate (on his / her opinion), he / she should vote in an order on all possible candidates (or options) in an election. The system must then, following a predetermined set of rules, produce an "elected order" by the population. In this work, we study some properties that are usually expected, or if desired, for such a system to be considered fair. We note that the outcome of an election can change dramatically when using different systems, even though both systems seem, a priori, to return fair choices. This confirms that the outcome of an election is directly linked to the type of electoral system that is adopted. We also make an analysis of several influential systems throughout the history of the so-called "Social Choice Theory". Finally, we end by showing a demonstration of Arrow's influential Theorem of Impossibility, which says that in ranking voting systems certain important conditions and can not be met simultaneously. We conclude, then, that in democratic polls it is necessary to give up one of these properties (or not to use a system by rank). In this way, the study of the most common electoral systems has a sophisticated role in helping us to define, criticize or influence the electoral system used in an election, helping us to perceive the strengths and weaknesses of each one of them.Ao longo da história, vários pesquisadores sugeriram diferentes sistemas eleitorais que tinham como intuito definir uma maneira justa ou ética de expressar a “vontade popular” sobre um certo conjunto de escolhas. O foco desse trabalho é em sistemas de votação por ranqueamento em que, ao invés de cada cidadão votar simplesmente no melhor candidato (em sua opnião), ele deverá votar em uma ordem sobre todos os possíveis candidatos (ou opções) de uma eleição. O sistema deve, então, seguindo um conjunto pré-determinado de regras, produzir uma “ordem eleita” pela população. Neste trabalho, estudamos algumas propriedades que usualmente se espera, ou se deseja, para que um tal sistema seja considerado justo. Observamos que o resultado de uma eleição pode mudar dramaticamente quando se usa sistemas diferentes, mesmo que ambos os sistemas parecem, à priori, retornar escolhas justas. Isso confirma que resultado de uma eleição está diretamente ligado ao tipo de sistema eleitoral que é adotado. Fazemos também uma análise de vários sistemas influentes ao longo da história da então chamada “Teoria da Escolha Social” para, enfim, terminamos exibindo uma demonstração do influente Teorema da Impossilidade de Arrow, que diz que em sistemas de votação por ranqueamento certas condições importantes e naturais não podem ser satisfeitas simultamente. Concluímos, então, que em votações democráticas é necessário abrir mão de uma dessas propriedades (ou não usar um sistema por ranqueamento). Dessa forma, o estudo dos sistemas eleitorais mais comuns tem um papel sofisticado em nos ajudar a definir, criticar ou influenciar o sistema eleitorial utilizado em uma eleição, nos ajudando a perceber os pontos fortes e fracos de cada um deles.Sistemas de votaçãoTeorema de ArrowTeoria da escolha socialVoting systemsArrow TheoremTheory of social choiceSistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow.Voting systems and Arrow's impossibility theorem.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisporreponame:Repositório Institucional da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)instacron:UFCinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessORIGINAL2018_dis_dpmitchel.pdf2018_dis_dpmitchel.pdfapplication/pdf1832616http://repositorio.ufc.br/bitstream/riufc/38773/1/2018_dis_dpmitchel.pdfd6df18f14727c6d416b96ae5cbe9dce9MD51LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-81748http://repositorio.ufc.br/bitstream/riufc/38773/2/license.txt8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33MD52riufc/387732019-01-10 09:55:12.44oai:repositorio.ufc.br:riufc/38773Tk9URTogUExBQ0UgWU9VUiBPV04gTElDRU5TRSBIRVJFClRoaXMgc2FtcGxlIGxpY2Vuc2UgaXMgcHJvdmlkZWQgZm9yIGluZm9ybWF0aW9uYWwgcHVycG9zZXMgb25seS4KCk5PTi1FWENMVVNJVkUgRElTVFJJQlVUSU9OIExJQ0VOU0UKCkJ5IHNpZ25pbmcgYW5kIHN1Ym1pdHRpbmcgdGhpcyBsaWNlbnNlLCB5b3UgKHRoZSBhdXRob3Iocykgb3IgY29weXJpZ2h0Cm93bmVyKSBncmFudHMgdG8gRFNwYWNlIFVuaXZlcnNpdHkgKERTVSkgdGhlIG5vbi1leGNsdXNpdmUgcmlnaHQgdG8gcmVwcm9kdWNlLAp0cmFuc2xhdGUgKGFzIGRlZmluZWQgYmVsb3cpLCBhbmQvb3IgZGlzdHJpYnV0ZSB5b3VyIHN1Ym1pc3Npb24gKGluY2x1ZGluZwp0aGUgYWJzdHJhY3QpIHdvcmxkd2lkZSBpbiBwcmludCBhbmQgZWxlY3Ryb25pYyBmb3JtYXQgYW5kIGluIGFueSBtZWRpdW0sCmluY2x1ZGluZyBidXQgbm90IGxpbWl0ZWQgdG8gYXVkaW8gb3IgdmlkZW8uCgpZb3UgYWdyZWUgdGhhdCBEU1UgbWF5LCB3aXRob3V0IGNoYW5naW5nIHRoZSBjb250ZW50LCB0cmFuc2xhdGUgdGhlCnN1Ym1pc3Npb24gdG8gYW55IG1lZGl1bSBvciBmb3JtYXQgZm9yIHRoZSBwdXJwb3NlIG9mIHByZXNlcnZhdGlvbi4KCllvdSBhbHNvIGFncmVlIHRoYXQgRFNVIG1heSBrZWVwIG1vcmUgdGhhbiBvbmUgY29weSBvZiB0aGlzIHN1Ym1pc3Npb24gZm9yCnB1cnBvc2VzIG9mIHNlY3VyaXR5LCBiYWNrLXVwIGFuZCBwcmVzZXJ2YXRpb24uCgpZb3UgcmVwcmVzZW50IHRoYXQgdGhlIHN1Ym1pc3Npb24gaXMgeW91ciBvcmlnaW5hbCB3b3JrLCBhbmQgdGhhdCB5b3UgaGF2ZQp0aGUgcmlnaHQgdG8gZ3JhbnQgdGhlIHJpZ2h0cyBjb250YWluZWQgaW4gdGhpcyBsaWNlbnNlLiBZb3UgYWxzbyByZXByZXNlbnQKdGhhdCB5b3VyIHN1Ym1pc3Npb24gZG9lcyBub3QsIHRvIHRoZSBiZXN0IG9mIHlvdXIga25vd2xlZGdlLCBpbmZyaW5nZSB1cG9uCmFueW9uZSdzIGNvcHlyaWdodC4KCklmIHRoZSBzdWJtaXNzaW9uIGNvbnRhaW5zIG1hdGVyaWFsIGZvciB3aGljaCB5b3UgZG8gbm90IGhvbGQgY29weXJpZ2h0LAp5b3UgcmVwcmVzZW50IHRoYXQgeW91IGhhdmUgb2J0YWluZWQgdGhlIHVucmVzdHJpY3RlZCBwZXJtaXNzaW9uIG9mIHRoZQpjb3B5cmlnaHQgb3duZXIgdG8gZ3JhbnQgRFNVIHRoZSByaWdodHMgcmVxdWlyZWQgYnkgdGhpcyBsaWNlbnNlLCBhbmQgdGhhdApzdWNoIHRoaXJkLXBhcnR5IG93bmVkIG1hdGVyaWFsIGlzIGNsZWFybHkgaWRlbnRpZmllZCBhbmQgYWNrbm93bGVkZ2VkCndpdGhpbiB0aGUgdGV4dCBvciBjb250ZW50IG9mIHRoZSBzdWJtaXNzaW9uLgoKSUYgVEhFIFNVQk1JU1NJT04gSVMgQkFTRUQgVVBPTiBXT1JLIFRIQVQgSEFTIEJFRU4gU1BPTlNPUkVEIE9SIFNVUFBPUlRFRApCWSBBTiBBR0VOQ1kgT1IgT1JHQU5JWkFUSU9OIE9USEVSIFRIQU4gRFNVLCBZT1UgUkVQUkVTRU5UIFRIQVQgWU9VIEhBVkUKRlVMRklMTEVEIEFOWSBSSUdIVCBPRiBSRVZJRVcgT1IgT1RIRVIgT0JMSUdBVElPTlMgUkVRVUlSRUQgQlkgU1VDSApDT05UUkFDVCBPUiBBR1JFRU1FTlQuCgpEU1Ugd2lsbCBjbGVhcmx5IGlkZW50aWZ5IHlvdXIgbmFtZShzKSBhcyB0aGUgYXV0aG9yKHMpIG9yIG93bmVyKHMpIG9mIHRoZQpzdWJtaXNzaW9uLCBhbmQgd2lsbCBub3QgbWFrZSBhbnkgYWx0ZXJhdGlvbiwgb3RoZXIgdGhhbiBhcyBhbGxvd2VkIGJ5IHRoaXMKbGljZW5zZSwgdG8geW91ciBzdWJtaXNzaW9uLgo=Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttp://www.repositorio.ufc.br/ri-oai/requestbu@ufc.br || repositorio@ufc.bropendoar:2019-01-10T12:55:12Repositório Institucional da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)false
dc.title.pt_BR.fl_str_mv Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow.
dc.title.en.pt_BR.fl_str_mv Voting systems and Arrow's impossibility theorem.
title Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow.
spellingShingle Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow.
Mitchel, Daniel Pires
Sistemas de votação
Teorema de Arrow
Teoria da escolha social
Voting systems
Arrow Theorem
Theory of social choice
title_short Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow.
title_full Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow.
title_fullStr Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow.
title_full_unstemmed Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow.
title_sort Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow.
author Mitchel, Daniel Pires
author_facet Mitchel, Daniel Pires
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Mitchel, Daniel Pires
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv Benevides, Fabricio Siqueira
contributor_str_mv Benevides, Fabricio Siqueira
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Sistemas de votação
Teorema de Arrow
Teoria da escolha social
Voting systems
Arrow Theorem
Theory of social choice
topic Sistemas de votação
Teorema de Arrow
Teoria da escolha social
Voting systems
Arrow Theorem
Theory of social choice
description Throughout history, several researchers have suggested different electoral systems that were intended to define a fair or ethical way of expressing the "popular will" over a certain set of choices. The focus of this work is on ranking polling systems where, instead of each citizen voting simply for the best candidate (on his / her opinion), he / she should vote in an order on all possible candidates (or options) in an election. The system must then, following a predetermined set of rules, produce an "elected order" by the population. In this work, we study some properties that are usually expected, or if desired, for such a system to be considered fair. We note that the outcome of an election can change dramatically when using different systems, even though both systems seem, a priori, to return fair choices. This confirms that the outcome of an election is directly linked to the type of electoral system that is adopted. We also make an analysis of several influential systems throughout the history of the so-called "Social Choice Theory". Finally, we end by showing a demonstration of Arrow's influential Theorem of Impossibility, which says that in ranking voting systems certain important conditions and can not be met simultaneously. We conclude, then, that in democratic polls it is necessary to give up one of these properties (or not to use a system by rank). In this way, the study of the most common electoral systems has a sophisticated role in helping us to define, criticize or influence the electoral system used in an election, helping us to perceive the strengths and weaknesses of each one of them.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2018
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2019-01-10T12:55:12Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2019-01-10T12:55:12Z
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dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
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dc.identifier.citation.fl_str_mv MITCHEL, Daniel Pires. Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow. 55 f. Dissertação (Mestrado Profissional em Matemática em Rede Nacional) - Centro de Ciências, Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza, 2018.
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/38773
identifier_str_mv MITCHEL, Daniel Pires. Sistemas de votação e o teorema da impossibilidade de Arrow. 55 f. Dissertação (Mestrado Profissional em Matemática em Rede Nacional) - Centro de Ciências, Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza, 2018.
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