A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2014
Autor(a) principal: Amorim, Paula Fernanda Patrício de lattes
Orientador(a): Silvestre, Ricardo Sousa lattes
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal da Paraí­ba
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pós Graduação em Filosofia
Departamento: Filosofia
País: BR
Palavras-chave em Português:
Palavras-chave em Inglês:
Área do conhecimento CNPq:
Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/tede/5646
Resumo: This text is intended to present a critique of the philosopher John Searle on Artificial Intelligence, more specifically to what Searle calls Strong Artificial Intelligence. For this, the main researched and scrutinized text will be your 1980 s article, Minds, brains and programs, in which is presented his chinese room argument. The argument seeks to show that it is not possible to duplicate the mind by purely formal processes, namely the manipulation of numbers 0 and 1 in a computer program that could be executed on any computer with a capable hardware to run this type of program. Therefore, it is suggested by Searle a thought experiment involving what he calls the "chinese room", which aims to demonstrate that even a computer running a program that involves the ability of understanding can never understand anything, since in his thought experiment, the same computational processes would be emulated in a different environment (the room, which will be equivalent to the computer), by a human being (which would be equivalent to the program on the computer) and still would not have been possible to state some understanding (in this case, the Chinese language), nor by the room neither by the man who would be within the room performing the same processes as a computer running a program accomplish, according Searle. Through exposure of that argument and criticism of Searle to Strong Artificial Intelligence, among other theories of the mind, such as the computationalism and functionalism, we will seek to achieve the understanding of what would be the contribution of Searle for the Philosophy of Mind with regard to discussions on Artificial Intelligence, analyzing both the argument as its criticism and the strengths and weaknesses of Searle s argumentation.
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spelling 2015-05-14T12:11:53Z2018-07-21T00:07:18Z2014-09-162018-07-21T00:07:18Z2014-02-27AMORIM, Paula Fernanda Patrício de. A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente. 2014. 99 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal da Paraí­ba, João Pessoa, 2014.https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/tede/5646This text is intended to present a critique of the philosopher John Searle on Artificial Intelligence, more specifically to what Searle calls Strong Artificial Intelligence. For this, the main researched and scrutinized text will be your 1980 s article, Minds, brains and programs, in which is presented his chinese room argument. The argument seeks to show that it is not possible to duplicate the mind by purely formal processes, namely the manipulation of numbers 0 and 1 in a computer program that could be executed on any computer with a capable hardware to run this type of program. Therefore, it is suggested by Searle a thought experiment involving what he calls the "chinese room", which aims to demonstrate that even a computer running a program that involves the ability of understanding can never understand anything, since in his thought experiment, the same computational processes would be emulated in a different environment (the room, which will be equivalent to the computer), by a human being (which would be equivalent to the program on the computer) and still would not have been possible to state some understanding (in this case, the Chinese language), nor by the room neither by the man who would be within the room performing the same processes as a computer running a program accomplish, according Searle. Through exposure of that argument and criticism of Searle to Strong Artificial Intelligence, among other theories of the mind, such as the computationalism and functionalism, we will seek to achieve the understanding of what would be the contribution of Searle for the Philosophy of Mind with regard to discussions on Artificial Intelligence, analyzing both the argument as its criticism and the strengths and weaknesses of Searle s argumentation.Este texto é destinado a apresentar a crítica do filósofo John Searle à Inteligência Artificial, mais especificamente ao que Searle chama Inteligência Artificial Forte. Para isso, o principal texto pesquisado e esmiuçado será o seu artigo de 1980, Minds, brains and programs, no qual é apresentado o seu argumento do quarto chinês. O argumento busca demonstrar que não é possível duplicar a mente através de processos meramente formais, a saber, da manipulação de números 0 e 1 em um programa de computador, que poderia ser executado em qualquer computador com um hardware capacitado para executar esse tipo de programa. Para tanto, é sugerida por Searle uma experiência de pensamento que envolve o que ele chama de quarto chinês , que tem como objetivo demonstrar que nem um computador executando um programa que envolve a habilidade da compreensão jamais poderá compreender coisa alguma, já que em sua experiência de pensamento, os mesmos processos computacionais seriam emulados de em um ambiente diferente (o quarto, que seria o equivalente ao computador), por um ser humano (que seria o equivalente ao programa no computador) e ainda assim não seria possível afirmar ter havido compreensão alguma (nesse caso, do idioma chinês), nem por parte do quarto e nem por parte do homem, que estaria dentro do quarto realizando os mesmos processos que um computador rodando um programa realizaria, de acordo com Searle. Através da exposição do argumento mencionado e das críticas de Searle à Inteligência Artificial Forte, dentre outras teorias da mente, tais quais o computacionalismo e o funcionalismo, buscar-se-á atingir a compreensão do que seria a contribuição de Searle para a Filosofia da Mente, no que diz respeito às discussões em torno da Inteligência Artificial, analisando tanto o argumento quanto as suas críticas e os pontos fracos e fortes da argumentação searleana.Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 459823 bytes, checksum: ba01cf778f8ecbe6426358c4f63af8e0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-02-27Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-21T00:07:18Z (GMT). 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dc.title.por.fl_str_mv A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente
title A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente
spellingShingle A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente
Amorim, Paula Fernanda Patrício de
Inteligência artificial
Consciência
Argumento do quarto chinês
artificial intelligence
consciousness
chinese room argument
CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
title_short A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente
title_full A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente
title_fullStr A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente
title_full_unstemmed A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente
title_sort A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente
author Amorim, Paula Fernanda Patrício de
author_facet Amorim, Paula Fernanda Patrício de
author_role author
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv Silvestre, Ricardo Sousa
dc.contributor.advisor1ID.fl_str_mv CPF:04967791387
dc.contributor.advisor1Lattes.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/6813932799267174
dc.contributor.authorID.fl_str_mv CPF:07466649408
dc.contributor.authorLattes.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/2131211149126572
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Amorim, Paula Fernanda Patrício de
contributor_str_mv Silvestre, Ricardo Sousa
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Inteligência artificial
Consciência
Argumento do quarto chinês
topic Inteligência artificial
Consciência
Argumento do quarto chinês
artificial intelligence
consciousness
chinese room argument
CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv artificial intelligence
consciousness
chinese room argument
dc.subject.cnpq.fl_str_mv CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
description This text is intended to present a critique of the philosopher John Searle on Artificial Intelligence, more specifically to what Searle calls Strong Artificial Intelligence. For this, the main researched and scrutinized text will be your 1980 s article, Minds, brains and programs, in which is presented his chinese room argument. The argument seeks to show that it is not possible to duplicate the mind by purely formal processes, namely the manipulation of numbers 0 and 1 in a computer program that could be executed on any computer with a capable hardware to run this type of program. Therefore, it is suggested by Searle a thought experiment involving what he calls the "chinese room", which aims to demonstrate that even a computer running a program that involves the ability of understanding can never understand anything, since in his thought experiment, the same computational processes would be emulated in a different environment (the room, which will be equivalent to the computer), by a human being (which would be equivalent to the program on the computer) and still would not have been possible to state some understanding (in this case, the Chinese language), nor by the room neither by the man who would be within the room performing the same processes as a computer running a program accomplish, according Searle. Through exposure of that argument and criticism of Searle to Strong Artificial Intelligence, among other theories of the mind, such as the computationalism and functionalism, we will seek to achieve the understanding of what would be the contribution of Searle for the Philosophy of Mind with regard to discussions on Artificial Intelligence, analyzing both the argument as its criticism and the strengths and weaknesses of Searle s argumentation.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2014-09-16
2018-07-21T00:07:18Z
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2014-02-27
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2015-05-14T12:11:53Z
2018-07-21T00:07:18Z
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dc.identifier.citation.fl_str_mv AMORIM, Paula Fernanda Patrício de. A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente. 2014. 99 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal da Paraí­ba, João Pessoa, 2014.
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/tede/5646
identifier_str_mv AMORIM, Paula Fernanda Patrício de. A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente. 2014. 99 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal da Paraí­ba, João Pessoa, 2014.
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