A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente
| Ano de defesa: | 2014 |
|---|---|
| Autor(a) principal: | |
| Orientador(a): | |
| Banca de defesa: | |
| Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
| Tipo de acesso: | Acesso aberto |
| Idioma: | por |
| Instituição de defesa: |
Universidade Federal da Paraíba
|
| Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Programa de Pós Graduação em Filosofia
|
| Departamento: |
Filosofia
|
| País: |
BR
|
| Palavras-chave em Português: | |
| Palavras-chave em Inglês: | |
| Área do conhecimento CNPq: | |
| Link de acesso: | https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/tede/5646 |
Resumo: | This text is intended to present a critique of the philosopher John Searle on Artificial Intelligence, more specifically to what Searle calls Strong Artificial Intelligence. For this, the main researched and scrutinized text will be your 1980 s article, Minds, brains and programs, in which is presented his chinese room argument. The argument seeks to show that it is not possible to duplicate the mind by purely formal processes, namely the manipulation of numbers 0 and 1 in a computer program that could be executed on any computer with a capable hardware to run this type of program. Therefore, it is suggested by Searle a thought experiment involving what he calls the "chinese room", which aims to demonstrate that even a computer running a program that involves the ability of understanding can never understand anything, since in his thought experiment, the same computational processes would be emulated in a different environment (the room, which will be equivalent to the computer), by a human being (which would be equivalent to the program on the computer) and still would not have been possible to state some understanding (in this case, the Chinese language), nor by the room neither by the man who would be within the room performing the same processes as a computer running a program accomplish, according Searle. Through exposure of that argument and criticism of Searle to Strong Artificial Intelligence, among other theories of the mind, such as the computationalism and functionalism, we will seek to achieve the understanding of what would be the contribution of Searle for the Philosophy of Mind with regard to discussions on Artificial Intelligence, analyzing both the argument as its criticism and the strengths and weaknesses of Searle s argumentation. |
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2015-05-14T12:11:53Z2018-07-21T00:07:18Z2014-09-162018-07-21T00:07:18Z2014-02-27AMORIM, Paula Fernanda Patrício de. A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente. 2014. 99 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal da Paraíba, João Pessoa, 2014.https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/tede/5646This text is intended to present a critique of the philosopher John Searle on Artificial Intelligence, more specifically to what Searle calls Strong Artificial Intelligence. For this, the main researched and scrutinized text will be your 1980 s article, Minds, brains and programs, in which is presented his chinese room argument. The argument seeks to show that it is not possible to duplicate the mind by purely formal processes, namely the manipulation of numbers 0 and 1 in a computer program that could be executed on any computer with a capable hardware to run this type of program. Therefore, it is suggested by Searle a thought experiment involving what he calls the "chinese room", which aims to demonstrate that even a computer running a program that involves the ability of understanding can never understand anything, since in his thought experiment, the same computational processes would be emulated in a different environment (the room, which will be equivalent to the computer), by a human being (which would be equivalent to the program on the computer) and still would not have been possible to state some understanding (in this case, the Chinese language), nor by the room neither by the man who would be within the room performing the same processes as a computer running a program accomplish, according Searle. Through exposure of that argument and criticism of Searle to Strong Artificial Intelligence, among other theories of the mind, such as the computationalism and functionalism, we will seek to achieve the understanding of what would be the contribution of Searle for the Philosophy of Mind with regard to discussions on Artificial Intelligence, analyzing both the argument as its criticism and the strengths and weaknesses of Searle s argumentation.Este texto é destinado a apresentar a crítica do filósofo John Searle à Inteligência Artificial, mais especificamente ao que Searle chama Inteligência Artificial Forte. Para isso, o principal texto pesquisado e esmiuçado será o seu artigo de 1980, Minds, brains and programs, no qual é apresentado o seu argumento do quarto chinês. O argumento busca demonstrar que não é possível duplicar a mente através de processos meramente formais, a saber, da manipulação de números 0 e 1 em um programa de computador, que poderia ser executado em qualquer computador com um hardware capacitado para executar esse tipo de programa. Para tanto, é sugerida por Searle uma experiência de pensamento que envolve o que ele chama de quarto chinês , que tem como objetivo demonstrar que nem um computador executando um programa que envolve a habilidade da compreensão jamais poderá compreender coisa alguma, já que em sua experiência de pensamento, os mesmos processos computacionais seriam emulados de em um ambiente diferente (o quarto, que seria o equivalente ao computador), por um ser humano (que seria o equivalente ao programa no computador) e ainda assim não seria possível afirmar ter havido compreensão alguma (nesse caso, do idioma chinês), nem por parte do quarto e nem por parte do homem, que estaria dentro do quarto realizando os mesmos processos que um computador rodando um programa realizaria, de acordo com Searle. Através da exposição do argumento mencionado e das críticas de Searle à Inteligência Artificial Forte, dentre outras teorias da mente, tais quais o computacionalismo e o funcionalismo, buscar-se-á atingir a compreensão do que seria a contribuição de Searle para a Filosofia da Mente, no que diz respeito às discussões em torno da Inteligência Artificial, analisando tanto o argumento quanto as suas críticas e os pontos fracos e fortes da argumentação searleana.Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 459823 bytes, checksum: ba01cf778f8ecbe6426358c4f63af8e0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-02-27Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-21T00:07:18Z (GMT). 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| dc.title.por.fl_str_mv |
A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente |
| title |
A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente |
| spellingShingle |
A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente Amorim, Paula Fernanda Patrício de Inteligência artificial Consciência Argumento do quarto chinês artificial intelligence consciousness chinese room argument CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
| title_short |
A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente |
| title_full |
A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente |
| title_fullStr |
A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente |
| title_full_unstemmed |
A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente |
| title_sort |
A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente |
| author |
Amorim, Paula Fernanda Patrício de |
| author_facet |
Amorim, Paula Fernanda Patrício de |
| author_role |
author |
| dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv |
Silvestre, Ricardo Sousa |
| dc.contributor.advisor1ID.fl_str_mv |
CPF:04967791387 |
| dc.contributor.advisor1Lattes.fl_str_mv |
http://lattes.cnpq.br/6813932799267174 |
| dc.contributor.authorID.fl_str_mv |
CPF:07466649408 |
| dc.contributor.authorLattes.fl_str_mv |
http://lattes.cnpq.br/2131211149126572 |
| dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Amorim, Paula Fernanda Patrício de |
| contributor_str_mv |
Silvestre, Ricardo Sousa |
| dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Inteligência artificial Consciência Argumento do quarto chinês |
| topic |
Inteligência artificial Consciência Argumento do quarto chinês artificial intelligence consciousness chinese room argument CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
| dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv |
artificial intelligence consciousness chinese room argument |
| dc.subject.cnpq.fl_str_mv |
CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
| description |
This text is intended to present a critique of the philosopher John Searle on Artificial Intelligence, more specifically to what Searle calls Strong Artificial Intelligence. For this, the main researched and scrutinized text will be your 1980 s article, Minds, brains and programs, in which is presented his chinese room argument. The argument seeks to show that it is not possible to duplicate the mind by purely formal processes, namely the manipulation of numbers 0 and 1 in a computer program that could be executed on any computer with a capable hardware to run this type of program. Therefore, it is suggested by Searle a thought experiment involving what he calls the "chinese room", which aims to demonstrate that even a computer running a program that involves the ability of understanding can never understand anything, since in his thought experiment, the same computational processes would be emulated in a different environment (the room, which will be equivalent to the computer), by a human being (which would be equivalent to the program on the computer) and still would not have been possible to state some understanding (in this case, the Chinese language), nor by the room neither by the man who would be within the room performing the same processes as a computer running a program accomplish, according Searle. Through exposure of that argument and criticism of Searle to Strong Artificial Intelligence, among other theories of the mind, such as the computationalism and functionalism, we will seek to achieve the understanding of what would be the contribution of Searle for the Philosophy of Mind with regard to discussions on Artificial Intelligence, analyzing both the argument as its criticism and the strengths and weaknesses of Searle s argumentation. |
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2014 |
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2014-09-16 2018-07-21T00:07:18Z |
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2014-02-27 |
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2015-05-14T12:11:53Z 2018-07-21T00:07:18Z |
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AMORIM, Paula Fernanda Patrício de. A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente. 2014. 99 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal da Paraíba, João Pessoa, 2014. |
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https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/tede/5646 |
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AMORIM, Paula Fernanda Patrício de. A crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial: uma abordagem em filosofia da mente. 2014. 99 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal da Paraíba, João Pessoa, 2014. |
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